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ABSTRACT
SOUTHIE VERSUS ROXBURY:
CRIME, WELFARE, AND THE RACIALIZED GUBERNATORIAL POLITICS
OF MASSACHUSETTS IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA
SEPTEMBER 2014
DANIEL T. KIRSCH, B.A., UNION COLLEGE
M.A., BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Associate Professor Dean E. Robinson
Racial and ethnic divisions at the national level and their effects on politics take on an
abstract character when not discussing specific communities. To obtain a reliable,
consistent, and potentially reliable measure of a relationship, demographic information
and voting behaviors at the small community, submetropolitan level must be examined in
high-turnout, same-office elections over a protracted period, ideally in a polity with a
penchant for racial tolerance. The political language of Boston has been mired in
racialization since at least the Civil Rights era, particularly since the Boston
antisegregation busing crisis of the 1970s. While previous research has focused on the
busing crisis itself as a marker of national politicization of local ethnic and racial
cleavages, the focus has not been on the consistently central political conversation of
Massachusetts to demonstrate both the totality of the rhetorical and electoral focus on
racial divisions and the immediate effect of such strategies on the respective racially
predominant communities of Boston. Through archival research in combination with
demographic and electoral data, it can be observed Massachusetts statewide political
candidates, alternately nominated by the two major parties, completely adopted the
Reagan strategy of poverty-shaming and race-baiting that had gained success during his
three campaigns for the presidency and his successor’s successful linkage of that strategy
to Massachusetts itself. It was in the post-Reagan era that this strategy found a
permanent home with Republicans, who won four consecutive gubernatorial elections by
utilizing this strategy, activating the white-working class neighborhoods of Boston while
alienating the majority-black neighborhoods. In order to maintain the new base of white
working-class voters, each new Republican candidate had to adopt the previous formulaic
combination of rhetoric and policy planks, no matter how inappropriate or irrelevant such
positions and rhetoric were with each successive election. Gains were consolidated by
credit-claiming about the policies enacted during Republican administrations to further
disadvantage the so-called underclass, populated by social welfare beneficiaries and
drug-affiliated criminals. These policies were political ends in themselves to further the
Reaganite political program for the next successive election until the strategy reached the
point of diminishing returns when racial diversity reached a critical mass in Boston in the
early 21st Century.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Racial and ethnic divisions at the national level and their effects on politics take
on an abstract character when not discussing specific communities. To obtain a reliable,
consistent, and potentially reliable measure of a relationship, demographic information
and voting behaviors at the small community, submetropolitan level must be examined in
high-turnout, same-office elections over a protracted period, ideally in a polity with a
penchant for racial tolerance. The political language of Boston has been mired in
racialization since at least the Civil Rights era, particularly since the Boston
antisegregation busing crisis of the 1970s. While previous research has focused on the
busing crisis itself as a marker of national politicization of local ethnic and racial
cleavages, the focus has not been on the consistently central political conversation of
Massachusetts to demonstrate both the totality of the rhetorical and electoral focus on
racial divisions and the immediate effect of such strategies on the respective racially
predominant communities of Boston.
Through archival research in combination with demographic and electoral data, it
can be observed Massachusetts statewide political candidates, alternately nominated by
the two major parties, completely adopted the Reagan strategy of poverty-shaming and
race-baiting that had gained success during his three campaigns for the presidency and
his successor’s successful linkage of that strategy to Massachusetts itself. It was in the
post-Reagan era that this strategy found a permanent home with Republicans, who won
four consecutive gubernatorial elections by utilizing this strategy, activating the whiteworking class neighborhoods of Boston while alienating the majority-black

1

neighborhoods. In order to maintain the new base of white working-class voters, each
new Republican candidate had to adopt the previous formulaic combination of rhetoric
and policy planks, no matter how inappropriate or irrelevant such positions and rhetoric
were with each successive election. Gains were consolidated by credit-claiming about
the policies enacted during Republican administrations to further disadvantage the socalled underclass, populated by social welfare beneficiaries and drug-affiliated criminals.
These policies were political ends in themselves to further the Reaganite political
program for the next successive election until the strategy reached the point of
diminishing returns when racial diversity reached a critical mass in Boston in the early
21st Century.
By examining demographic and partisan changes in the city of Boston from 1970
to 2010, this study asks if there a link between the inaccurate but heavily implied racial
tropes and stereotypes concerning issues like welfare and crime, and the fortunes of
Republican candidates for governor in the state of Massachusetts.
Were one to exist, Boston could lay claim to the title as the capital of white
American cities. Of the 366 metropolitan areas in the United States, Greater Boston ranks
10th in total population, and 5th in total non-Hispanic white population, as of the 2010
Census. Of the ten largest metropolitan areas, Greater Boston has by far the highest nonHispanic white percentage of the population, at 75%. In the 2010 census the percentage
of white residents dropped to 47% compared to more than 50% in 2000.1 Compared to
other major cities in the Northeast, Boston has always had a larger percentage of white
residents. In 1950, for example, Boston had a higher proportion of white residents than
New York, from both the city and regional perspective.
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The black population in the city of Boston alone is one of the oldest and most
established in the United States. The proportion of total black residents in the city has
remained virtually unchanged in the last five decades, at just over twenty percent. The
black population in absolute terms (150,000) is greater than the black populations of
Newark, New Jersey; Jackson, Mississippi; Montgomery, Alabama; and only slightly less
than Cleveland, Ohio; New Orleans, Louisiana; St. Louis, Missouri; or Atlanta, Georgia.
The black population in Greater Boston is almost double that number.
In terms of other racial and ethnic groups, Boston has a substantial AsianAmerican population and a growing Latino one. More than a quarter-million AsianAmericans reside in the region, and the emerging Latino population in the region has
surpassed 400,000.
Despite important demographic chances in the past decades, the city of Boston is
very segregated. This is clear from the city’s black-white dissimilarity index of housing
nationally, which scores city of Boston as 75 out of 100, which is considered “very
high.”2
Thus white Bostonians are not likely to share a residential area with Bostonians
identified with a racial or ethnic minority. Historically white neighborhoods such as the
upscale Beacon Hill, the nearby Back Bay, the Irish American stronghold of South
Boston, and the Italian American North End are worlds apart from historically black
Roxbury and the majority-black neighborhoods of Dorchester.
According to some scholars, the United States has witnessed something of a “sea
change” in racial attitudes in this now-passing generational era.3 Following the successful
election of President Obama in 2008 and, before that Governor Deval Patrick in 2006,
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this might appear to be the case. But for at least two decades prior, many white Boston
residents showed anything but a willingness to transcend racial attitudes. Indeed, as this
study will demonstrate from 1970 to 2010, white allegiance to the Republican Party in
greater Boston can be clearly identified and accounts for the Republican Party’s success
in gubernatorial elections. The key has been a strategy that denies the national party’s
emphasis on lifestyle-oriented issues such as religion, marriage equality, abortion and
contraception, but does rely on what this study will refer to as “racial conservatism.”4 If
conservatism refers to a philosophy of limited government, less regulated markets, and
the maintenance and promotion of “traditional” values, racial conservatism refers to the
policy emphasis on those domains in which minorities are central to the narrative. At
least since the 1960s, those policies have included welfare, criminal justice, affirmative
action, and, more recently, immigration.
Republicans in Massachusetts have been more successful in winning statewide
offices than their enrollment numbers would have predicted. Despite a 5-to-1
Democratic advantage in party enrollment, Republicans won four straight gubernatorial
races in the 1990s and early 2000s.5 They did this through a language and policy of racial
conservatism. This meant opposition to social welfare, promotion of “tough-on-crime”
policies such as the death penalty and mandatory minimum sentencing, as well as
“nonracial” positions on tax and revenue reduction. Recently, Republican candidates to
state offices have championed policies that are decidedly hostile to immigration, as other
Republican parties in New England have done.6
Over this era, partisanship among Boston neighborhoods is striking. As this study
will show, the racial and ethnic composition of city wards is strongly correlated to the
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support for Republican candidates for governor. The so-called “black wards” of Boston
consistently rejected statewide (and national) Republican candidates since Governor
Sargent in 1974. Indeed Roxbury, the home to the greatest number of black residents in
the state, historically and presently, virtually never votes the same way as South Boston
which remains predominantly white.7
Methodological Overview
Through construction of an 1) historical political narrative; 2) the utilization of of
statistical data on racial/ethnic demographics and electoral outcomes; and 3) content
analysis of campaign speeches and political statements, we can observe how each
neighborhood responded to racial conservatism in gubernatorial politics. This dissertation
therefore offers a city-level view of racial conservatism in gubernatorial elections.
Data
1. This study drew on an exhaustive body of secondary scholarship on the history of
Boston, and related work on urban politics that takes Boston as a central case. This
literature establishes the developments that both sets Boston apart from other cities,
but also illustrates the way the trends are representative of patterns common to the
Northeastern United States. Furthermore, to construct the historical context in racial
and ethnic residential patterns, partisanship trends and relevant political and
economic developments that establish the context of the study.
2. The data comes mainly from the City of Boston, the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, United States Census, the Boston Globe, and the Boston
Redevelopment Authority (BRA). The BRA uses the same ward boundaries drawn
by the Boston City Council in 1925 and that are used by the city and the state to set
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election boundaries within the city at the city government, state government, and
congressional district level. The data cannot be reliable as they come from official
sources at the City of Boston and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in their
annual election reports. Through several special requests to the City Clerk’s office,
precinct-level data from the major elections from 1995-2005 were obtained. The rest
were on the website the city maintains.8 The state’s annual report “Massachusetts
Election Statistics” was used to confirm the data found at the city level.9 Although
data on race and partisanship exist in the period preceding the 1990s, the reliability
and consistency of the available partisan and racial data only fully coincides during
the 1980-2010 period.10 Thanks to a thorough archive of Boston city election returns,
not only are citywide returns possible, but so are neighborhood returns.
3. Through an historical analysis of campaign rhetoric and themes as reported by the
newspapers and through television advertisements and official speeches (in Chapter
4), the extent of racially focused content in gubernatorial campaigns will be
considered. As scholars of racism in American politics have noted, we would expect
Republicans to rely on coded, anti-minority appeals after 1968, as hypothesized by
both Carmines and Stimson (1989), as well as Mendelberg (2001). Particular focus
on crime and welfare after the 1960s is the hallmark of Republican strategy,
especially in regards to the white constituent support they wish to reach. Information
on campaign rhetoric is from the Boston Globe, which is the flagship paper of Boston
and New England. It regularly reports on the transforming nature of Boston’s
neighborhoods, and it also reports regularly, of course, on partisan campaign rhetoric
utilized in the state. To the extent that ads themselves have mobilization
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consequences or are controversial, they are reported in the Boston Globe. The Globe
endorses candidates, and it delivers daily newspapers more than just to the city of
Boston. It has a massive circulation in the greater Boston area, and penetration
beyond the borders of Massachusetts. In short, the Boston Globe’s beat is all of New
England. The study also attempted to draw on platform data, but platforms ceased
being printed in the Boston Globe after 1972, and few candidates or party members
read them today. Campaigns are analyzed here in the speeches, writings, public
statements, and campaign commercials that.11
Methods: The Research Question and Case Selection
Gerring notes in his explanation of how explanatory variables can exist without a
multiplicity of cases, that “what distinguishes the case study method from all other
methods is its reliance on covariation demonstrated by a single unit.” Further, the case
study method attempts to “illuminate features of a broader set of units.”(343) For this
analysis, the within unit variation over time is essential to the analysis. This study looks
at patterns of racial and ethnic demographic characteristics of neighborhoods, alongside
indicators of party support over time. If racial conservatism shapes the electoral fortunes
of Republican candidates for state office in Boston, it becomes the “crucial case”
according to Gerring.12
Why Boston?
Some additional points about Boston as a case are worth considering. First,
Boston is a city with historically low diversity but with a reputation for liberalism, as
evidenced by support for the Democratic Party. Second, it is also a city in which race has
been a visible point of conflict in city politics, so much so that politicians like Reagan
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and Nixon both alluded to and capitalized upon political developments in that city (read:
busing). Third, the Boston area itself is both geographically and culturally almost
synonymous with New England. The utility of studying Boston, however, is not its
disproportionate numerical influence in the state, but in its role as the “Hub” that actually
sets trends and drives change culturally, economically, politically, and racially in the
state. Finally, insofar as Boston shares a media market with New Hampshire, home of the
first-in-the-nation primary since 1952, Boston voters/readers are something a barometer
for appeal and influence of certian types of political rhetoric.
Why Gubernatorial Contests?
Another methodological choice that was made was to study the gubernatorial
elections themselves, without attention to state legislature or statewide legislative races.
There is a simple reason for this decision: it is the grandest and most noticeable office in
the city of Boston, even exceeding the mayor, and it straddles the line between city and
suburb. It occupies the “corner office” on historical Beacon Hill, indicating the center of
power in the city. It is thus the most visible and most popular political office in Boston,
and the most competitive. The turnout levels, campaign spending, rhetoric, and overall
strategy seem to reflect that level of attention. It is also notable that gubernatorial
elections have only been midterm elections since 1966. Formerly, they were biennial
elections, thus this newer calendar opens up new possibilities for study. Further, it
demonstrates the degree to which Massachusetts governors and politicians in general
have come to occupy a central place in American politics in the last half-century. Surely
the breeding ground for nationally prominent politicians deserves the spotlight in a way
that perhaps no other state does. Finally, if the center of Massachusetts culture is indeed
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the Hub of Boston, then learning how they win or lose elections in their backyard is vital
to understanding the dynamics and parameters of national political debate.

Conclusion
Boston and Massachusetts politics are reflective and constitutive of national
trends. For example, Reagan rhetorically attacked the poor black population of the United
States in speeches first to Boston-area voters in both 1976 and 1980. Indeed, the
foremost example of racialized television advertising, the Willie Horton/tough-on-crime
campaign of George Bush in 1988 was directed at the Democratic presidential nominee
and Governor of Massachusetts Michael Dukakis, whose Massachusetts Republican
opponents had unearthed the story and fed it to the Bush campaign. By the time of the
next state election, in 1990, Democrats and Republicans were racing to distance
themselves from Dukakis-style “liberal” governance.
The outline for the dissertation is as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature related to historical and urban studies of
race and politics in the United States, especially drawing from the subfields of American
Political Development, survey research on implicit racial bias in U.S. elections, and urban
politics and history.
Chapter 3 discusses the characteristics, racial/ethnic and political, of
neighborhoods of Boston themselves. It also explores the trend of white migration to the
suburbs and how the Republican party has been able to capitalize on that trend.
Chapter 4 examines the trends presented in chapter 3 in relation to gubernatorial
contests in the state. The racial conservatism evident in Republican candidates’ speeches,
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which resonate with suburban white constituents of the Greater Boston region, and to a
consistent and discernible subset of majority white neighborhoods in the city.
In Chapter 5, the study reiterates the main findings and considers the implications
with respect to new developments in Boston city politics, state politics, and the broader
national landscape of race and politics in the United States.
1

Notes

Census data collected by US2010: Discover America in a New Century, a project of Brown University
and the Russell Sage Foundation, found at http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/index.htm.
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reports, defines it this way: “The dissimilarity index measures the relative separation or integration of
groups across all neighborhoods of a city or metropolitan area. If a city's white-black dissimilarity index
were 65, that would mean that 65% of white people would need to move to another neighborhood to make
whites and blacks evenly distributed across all neighborhoods.
(http://www.censusscope.org/us/s40/p75000/chart_dissimilarity.html)
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-segregated-cities-census-maps-2013-4?op=1.
3 Bryant II, Wilbur. "Racist Propensities of Whites in Black/White Relationships versus Racist Propensities
of Whites in Endogamous Relationships" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, GA, Aug 16, 2003,
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p106033_index.html.
3For a public intellectual take on what this phenomenon means politically, see “A Job Too Big for One
Man” by Orlando Patterson, April 4, 2009, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/opinion/04patterson.html?_r=0.
3For a statistical look at this phenomenon, one brief study of the Millenial generation is a helpful look: “6
new findings about Millennials” by Bruce Drake, March 7, 2014
3 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/03/07/6-new-findings-about-millennials/
4 Prominent actors such as William F. Weld have indeed publicly denounced the national party’s platform
in those areas, while still maintaining a viable state party that shares the same name.
5Weld and Scott Brown,Republicans in the state saw no statewide victories in the 1980s for either the U.S.
Senate or the corner office, or in any other constitutional office.
6
See 2006 Massachusetts Republican Party Platform.
7
The one exception being 1990, in which the Democratic candidate had explicitly defamed the Roxbury
neighborhood as “a bunch of drug addicts.”
8
“Election Results” at City of Boston.gov, http://www.cityofboston.gov/elections/results/, accessed June
12, 2014.
9
Massachusetts Election Results at www.archive.org.
10
Several reports from the Boston Redevelopment Authority, with special thanks to Minsheng Kang and
Mark Melnik from the BRA.
11
Most were found on videos of historical candidate campaign statements and debates, and other public
speeches on C-Span.org.
12
See Gerring, John, Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
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CHAPTER 2
RACE, CITIES, AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
The following review of scholarly literature concerning the relationship between
conservatism and race (racism) draws from these research streams: 1) race and American
political development; 2) survey and experimental research on implicit appeals to antiblack and anti-Latino sentiment; 3) studies that follow evolution of white perceptions
about welfare and crime in the United States; and 3) urban politics.
Race and American Political Development
Race and American Political development represents a subset of a broader
scholarship on “American Political Development” although researchers in the former
would suggest that there is no meaningful way to separate the two. The subfield of
American political development (APD) has features that separate it from the dominant,
behavior approach in political science. Scholars working within this tradition often use
historical and comparative methodologies to examine development and change in
American politics. Most of the work in APD relies on detailed historical analysis and
draws upon primary and secondary sources in order to explain political and policy
outcomes. The study of the “the state” itself and the democratic (or not) nature of formal
institutions (such as political parties) is central to the APD mission of historical
scholarship for deeper and more comprehensive understanding of politics. APD scholars
thus pay careful attention to the state and political institutions.
The race and APD scholarship considers the ways racial ideologies interact with
state formation and institutional development to produce political and policy outcomes.
As with the broader APD field, ideas and institutions are carefully considered. The
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seminal work is Rogers Smith’s Civic Ideals.1 In an exhaustive examination of federal
case material, Smith shows that three traditions interact to shape beliefs about citizenship
in the United States: liberalism, republicanism, and ascriptive Americanism.
Much of Smith’s work has also helped define the field of race in American
Political Development, and the larger field of APD itself. Rogers Smith and Desmond
King, in a recent book that followed two earlier articles, have created the framework of
“racial alliances” to explain the terrain of race and American politics. The essence of
their thesis concerns “alliances” which are “coalitions of state institutions and other
political actors and organizations that seek to secure and exercise governing power in
demographically, economically, and ideologically structured contexts that define the
range of opportunities open to political actors.”2 Thus, racial alliances themselves are
central to American politics, and institutional structures have been built on the foundation
of racial orders attempting to perpetuate their own power.
Through examples that look at the presidential politics of Andrew Jackson,
Andrew Johnson, and Harry Truman, King and Smith deftly argue that American
political leaders tend to enlist black and white racial differences to their advantages, so
long as the championing of a racially charged cause can assist in furthering existing
political goals. Those goals may coincide with racialized values of the American
electorate. For example, most white Americans in the pre-World War II period were not
bothered by the racial segregation of public and private facilities, which, in turn,
encouraged the formation of segregated labor unions and activist organizations such as
the National Negro Congress and the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. This
mobilization of northern black activists and workers was instrumental in the Civil Rights
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movement despite the fact that members of these organizations were predominantly from
the northern cities that lay outside the supposedly peculiar American South.
Where King and Smith’s work is perhaps most helpful is through the prism of
negotiating the increasingly variegated demands between racial alliances. What was once
a self-perpetuating, path-dependent set of institutions created to encourage new purchase
into an aging assembly of politically powerful elite actors, is now more than ever subject
to crosscurrents of age, class, and gender which themselves attempt to form alliances of
political difference that privilege particular identities.
Klinkner and Smith’s The Unsteady March (1999) builds the case that significant
progress toward racial equality can occur only under certain, historically infrequent,
conditions.3 In a breathtaking sweep of the historical record, these authors identify the
“political opportunity structure” in three factors that together equal the formula for racial
change (though not necessarily occurring simultaneously or in concert): 1) military
mobilization necessitating black enlistment, 2) patriotic themes of inclusion and
democracy when battling a foreign power that seems apparently to lack such values, 3)
and protest movements that force political leaders to respond to calls for remembering
those values.4 They also find that periods of progress are always followed by
retrenchment.
In keeping with the historical tradition of American Political Development,
Klinkner and Smith draw on the past to offer insight to the present. They identify “eleven
significant similarities in the policy and political debates of the late nineteenth century
and the current era.”5 These similarities include rhetoric focusing on state and local
authority, the “color-blind” argument in political discourse, laissez-faire liberalism’s

13

popularity, and a tendency toward emphasizing and promoting the imagery of black
criminality by the dominant white racial alliance.
Ira Katznelson, in his titular “coda” to The City in American Political
Development, celebrates the return to attention to urban studies within the discipline of
political science and discusses the importance of cities to American political
development.6 To learn the “structure and behavior in American political history” as
Katznelson puts it, such attention is essential. Katznelson offers a similar view of
“orders” (later “alliances”) elaborated by Smith and King. The goal for understanding
city politics historically is to “examine the quest by machine politicians and reformers
alike to bias political participation in order to secure power.” He paints with a fairly
broad brush that calls for looking at statewide actors who campaign explicitly against or
appeal to certain populations within an urban regime.
Katznelson’s primary exhortation is one of further research into the hows and
whys of social interaction among peoples of different groups, often divided by race, class,
or religion. He also urges careful examination of how political institutions treat minority
groups within urban political regimes. Katznelson believes that cities are fertile ground in
the American Political Development tradition of attempting to reconcile constitutional
democracies founded upon a social contract of toleration, with deep and increasing
polarization because of their ever-present tendency toward heterogeneity. For Katznelson
city politics are not only about city government actors or candidates. They are inclusive
of, and even drivers of, regional and state, and sometimes national politics.
Under the broad umbrella of American Political Development scholarship, a
relatively recent work by Robert Smith is elevant to the present study. In Racism and
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Conservatism (2010) Smith argues that what is usually called “systemic racism” is
virtually synonymous with conservatism in America.7 Smith traces the “Conservative
Movement” in America to rise of Ronald Reagan and his presidency. Conservatism in
America, he posits, is unique compared to others around the world because it cannot be
linked to an historical order that does not rest on racial hierarchy. American
conservatism has its roots in the evolution of slavery and capitalism.
His thesis is compelling. Smith points out that Reagan began his 1980 campaign
for president in Philadelphia, Mississippi, a small town with no distinguishing features
other than it was the site where three young civil rights workers were murdered by Ku
Klux Klan members in cooperation with local authorities in 1963. Reagan invoked
“states’ rights,” which Smith rightly identifies as code for racial segregation, in his
speech several times. Here Reagan was not defending federal intervention for civil rights,
but opposing it.8 Perhaps the clearest expression of Smith’s thesis is the following
assertion:
Although Reagan perhaps protested too much and too often, it is the argument of
this chapter that his antiblack policies derive not from his racial views but from
his ideology. That is, it was Reagan’s doctrinaire, principled Lockean
conservatism that resulted in racist policies and practices. This conservatism
required him to oppose any use of government power to secure civil rights for
black people because to do so violated core conservative principles of limited
government, individual liberty, and states’ rights.9
Smith further articulates the striking correlation between the rise of the
conservative movement to white reaction to and rejection of policy benefits derived from
civil rights laws and War on Poverty programs. The figure of 1964 Republican
presidential nominee Barry Goldwater figures significantly into his argument, as well, in
that it was the first clear example of the Republican party capitalizing on racial
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resentment in an open, combative manner that would soon evolved to a central place in
American political conversation. As Robert Smith explains:
There is a near political science consensus on the significance of the 1964 election
in reshaping the partisan relationship between racism and conservatism in the
United States. Carmines and Stimson, who pioneered in studying this race based
partisan shift, saw that during the 1950s and early 1960s, the key issue that
distinguished liberals from conservatives centered on the New Deal. During this
period, such attitudes had no correlation with issues of race. Beginning with the
1964 election, however, this pattern began to change. Race increasingly became
the key issue that divided left and right sides of the political spectrum and
organized peoples’ attitudes on a variety of other issues--including what by then
were closely associated questions of social welfare policy. Race was now the
central issue cleavage in partisan politics.10
According to Smith, Reagan felt compelled to both make significant cuts in social
programs that disproportionately benefitted black Americans and also roll back most
enforcement of civil rights legislation to the extent he was able to exercise discretion in
his role as the chief executive, and his support for these actions among his electoral base
of support was apparent in his resounding victories in 1980, 1984, and the election of his
successor in 1988.
Leaders of the Democratic party soon appreciated the ways racial resentment
could be used for the purpose of winning elections. In 1984 and 1992, respectively,
leaders of the party had commissioned studies that found working-class white voters were
being lured to the Republican side simply through appeals to racial resentment and
stereotype, the so-called “Reagan Democrats.” Politicians like Bill Clinton eventually
employed the same strategy. In his campaign for the White House, Clinton condemned
the rapper-activist “Sister Souljah” for comments in which she seemingly agreed that
black rioters in Los Angeles should kill police officers after the Rodney King verdict. His
condemnation was widely seen as a symbolic gesture to distance himself from the
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association of the Democratic party to African Americans. In that year, Clinton also left
the campaign trail to oversee the execution of a mentally disabled black man, Ricky Ray
Rector. With these and other examples, Smith demonstrates that at the national level,
race had already been a prominent and perhaps decisive factor in American national
politics decades before the election of the nation’s first black president.
Feagin too makes the case that the Republican party relies on whiteness to get
elected and thus governs primarily for whites. Whiteness and white supremacy are
collective political identities which see as inevitable, or at least currently desirable, the
predominance of white political power in the United States. Through his “White Racial
Frame” Feagin makes a historical case that the white view of American development has
been the dominant view, and that it has required the demeaning of African-Americans
and Native Americans. This has been true, he demonstrates, from the European and
British colonial era through the Founding of the Republic, and into the modern political
era. His work is even more historically thoroughgoing than Smith’s, and he takes the
reader through into the progression of each era of the white racial “undemocratic” frame
into the modern day. Feagin too mentions the Goldwater-inspired “Southern Strategy” as
Robert Smith does, but makes clear that these patterns were discernible before the 1960s.
For example, in “Urban Black Revolts and White Reactions,” he provides evidence that
white conceptions of black behavior as “criminal” were clear also in the 1930s and 1940s
with talk of a “negro problem.”
By the time of the Reagan administration itself, Feagin explores how the focus of
U.S. policy shifted from a War on Poverty to the War on Drugs. Tighter and more
punitive law enforcement has created “black criminality”: “Having a record, they often
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lose the right to vote, serve on juries, get decent-paying jobs, rent public housing, and
secure normal loans of various kinds. As a result of these state-imposed difficulties, they
frequently end up back in prison.”11
Throughout the 1990s era of Newt Gingrich and Bob Dole and throughout the
George W. Bush Administration, Feagin builds the case that the Republican Party moved
so forcefully to capture white votes that it compelled the Democratic Party to employ
similar strategies. What is unique about Feagin’s treatment, however, is his
characterization of the white racial frame as an authoritarian frame. He describes his
definition of authoritarianism thus, in describing the work of 1940s social scientist T.W.
Adorno:
For decades now, social scientists have found many close ties between the
authoritarian orientations of whites and their negative and hostile attitudes toward
specific racial and ethnic outgroups...These researchers found that those with
more authoritarian socio-political views differed from those with less
authoritarian views in their greater willingness to submit to authority, their
tendency to be fearful of and stereotype others, and their great concern for social
ranking and the status quo.12
This is not necessarily a unique formulation in itself, but very interesting in its
application to racial division in the United States. As Feagin explains “Social science
research indicates that the level of societal threat can make a difference in the activation
of strong authoritarian views,” and playing to fears to the social order—crime in the
1980s and terrorism after 2001—has been key to Republican success.13
Symbolic or Implicit Racism
For several decades, social scientists in the behavioral tradition have studied and
debated the change in racial attitudes since the 1960s, and how these changes related to
political developments over time.14 Numerous studies have show that symbolic racism is
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associated with whites’ racial policy preferences. Symbolic racism refers to the following
beliefs:
(1) blacks no longer face much prejudice or discrimination;
(2) blacks’ failure to progress results from their unwillingness to work hard
enough;
(3) blacks are demanding too much too fast; and
(4) blacks have gotten more than they deserve.15
Sears & Henry (2002) point out that the theory of symbolic racism can predict whites’
policy preferences, outweighing other variables like ideology, party identification, and
even, such things as beliefs in blacks’ genetic inferiority. The concept of symbolic racism
is not only unique and distinguishable from traditional and more general conservatism,
but is also a “blend of anti-black affect and individualistic values.16
In her work on “racial priming” Tali D. Mendelberg takes insights from the
political science and sociological exploration of implicit bias.17 The essential thrust of
her research is explicated thus in her 2009 work:
Parties often, but not always, construct implicit appeals to mobilize racial stereotypes,
fears, or resentments. But intent is a cause, not a characteristic, of racial appeals. We
cannot rely on intent alone to distinguish between implicit and nonracial appeals. I define
an implicitly racial appeal as one that contains a recognizable, if subtle, racial reference.
Implicit references can be visual or verbal. The modern norm of equality was established
at the same time that television came into widespread use, so the party of the right has
often made use of visual cues to construct its implicit racial appeals. Television allows a
party to separate the visual and verbal content of its communication. It can introduce
racially loaded images but avoid using racial words that would alert viewers to the racial
meaning of the message.18
Mendelberg pioneered the serious analytical study of racial appeals through a
mixed-method approach of experiments, survey research, and historiography. Her
experiments consisted of showing a group a news segment featuring an African American
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convicted felon and rapist, while another group saw a story about pollution in the Boston
Harbor. As Mendleberg explains:
I measured participants’ level of racial resentment in advance of the experiment,
then exposed them to their randomly assigned message, and then asked them a
series of questions about their political opinions and predisposition . . . The results
show that the implicit racial message primed racial resentment. Resentful people
exposed to the implicit message expressed more racially conservative opinions
than their counterparts in the control condition (their opinions on nonracial
matters remained similar to those of the control group). Unresentful people
showed no movement, except in a slightly more racially liberal direction.19
In other words, Mendelberg’s results (which she references again in 2008 and 2009)
show that “priming” occurs when implicitly racial campaign themes are emphasized and
that this priming results in a direct political consequence of being more likely to support
candidates that take more racially conservative public policy positions. Such evidence
has extraordinarily important implications.
Mendelberg reviewed political history for evidence of the use of implicit, coded
appeals in U.S. elections and finds them in abundance. She argues that the “Race Card”
has been played in political campaigns that have utilized racial “code words” to activate
racial stereotypes and prejudices among whites.20 Those code words, as previously
discussed, evoke negative views about blacks in those policy domains in which whites
believe blacks are a problem (e.g. criminal justice, welfare, etc.).
One point that Mendelberg asserts relevant to this study in her book wais that that
gubernatorial elections are an appropriate barometer of the national mood, citing the
success of several governors in 1994 and 1998 elections who championed their
opposition to “crime” and “welfare.”21 She neglects to point out that these governors are
largely elected during “midterm” elections halfway through and not coincident with
election to the White House, and if anything those governors tend to reflect the desires of
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a smaller, older, whiter, and ultimately more conservative electorate that votes during the
midterms. Indeed, as will be seen in chapter 4, a former prosecutor in Reagan’s War on
Crime, Bill Weld, swept every county in Massachusetts to win back the governor’s chair
in his 1994 reelection campaign, citing his success in fighting crime and welfare, and
giving very little time to much else.
Social welfare has become a routine topic of conversation during these midterm
campaigns, as people are less focused on international and even national issues of
concern to the federal government, despite the fact that Congress is also re-elected during
these elections. Domestic concerns rule the day, and “domestic” might as well be
synonymous with the term “social welfare” which encompasses the heavily racialized
welfare state, the health care regime, education, and even the judicial system.
Mendelberg has inspired her own followers, notably Charlton McIlwain and
Stephen Caliendo, who have published a recent book22 that primarily examines the appeal
to racial priming that occurs when a white candidate (usually a Republican) faces a
candidate of a minority race (usually a Democrat). Their contention is simply that there
is a relatively small universe of terms and images that television and radio commercials
can use to reinforce racial stereotypes that are both effective and still socially acceptable.
They also look for this evidence where one would expect to find it, in, for example, the
cases outlined above.
McIlwain and Caliendo stay away from identifying racial appeals from candidates
who target minority populations rather than their opponents. Although this approach
excludes research into the history of racial appeals, this contribution is valuable in terms
of identifying whether a candidate’s racial identity can be exploited during a major
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political campaign, but that the approach must be coded and implicit, rather than explicit.
This led the research team to examine several statewide campaigns, and of course into the
2008 presidential campaign of John McCain against Barack Obama.
The words McIlwain & Caliendo find used by most of white Republican
candidates referring to themselves were “trustworthy” and “hardworking” while the
references they made to the alternative candidate, a black Democrat, were
“untrustworthy” “taking advantage” “liberal” and often “criminal.” All of these words,
the authors assert, are racial code words used to reinforce stereotypes about black
candidates that would be enough motivation to force voters to choose the white
Republican who is “trustworthy” and “hardworking.”23
Again, this work is tremendously valuable, but more work ought to be done of the
sort Mendelberg has done, simply because there have been many more black in political
ads than there have been black candidates, and much more mention of issues such as
crime and welfare, as well.
Crime, Welfare, and Racial Appeals in American Politics
A significant body of work shows how racist stereotypes have produced
disparities in poverty and welfare provision, and in rates of arrest and incarceration.
These statistics—the disproportionate representation of blacks and other minorities on
welfare and in prison—served to reproduce the stereotypes behind these patterns.
In the area of criminal justice, the late Sociologist and Criminologist Coramae
Richey Mann’s classic 1993 work, Unequal Justice, first demonstrated vast racial
inequalities at virtually every stage of the criminal justice system. Mann cites both
statistical and anecdotal data that demonstrates persuasive evidence of racial bias against
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racial minorities at every stage of the criminal justice process.24 The chief accusations of
racism against prosecutors focus on the decision to use peremptory jury challenges solely
on the basis of race to exclude jurors from juries. The statistics are compelling. Perhaps
the more disturbing statistics are from the area of death sentences. A majority, 54.6
percent of executions from 1930 to 1984, were for black defendants. In virtually every
study Mann cites, the presence racial discrimination in sentencing defendants to death
should be an obvious conclusion of researchers. Further, 90% of those executions for
rape and murder offenses were African-Americans during this time period.
Mann showed that at every stage of the criminal justice system AfricanAmericans receive harsher treatment, from arrest to bail to plea bargaining (yet it is
implied persuasively that African-Americans are more likely to try to plead guilty in
hopes of a lesser sentence, whereas this lesser sentence almost never occurs) to jury
selection, to indictment, to length of sentencing, to severity of sentencing, up to and
including the death penalty.25
While Unequal Justice pioneered the combination of qualitative and quantitative
research into criminology, political science has been making severe inroads into the
criminal justice in the form of the new concept of the “carceral state” meaning the
network of institutions in the United States that increase the authority of the judicial/law
enforcement/prison system at the expense of accepted definitions of liberal democracy.
Much of this work implicitly and explicity explore the racial inequality inherent in the
growth of the carceral state. Vesla Weaver and Amy Lerman’s work has contributed
significantly to the above literature. They have found that the criminal justice system
today in the United States fundamentally has several characteristics. For instance, it is
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racialized to the point of an inclination generally among police to profile black men and
women in their routine police work26; create a system wherein black citizens have a
fundamental distrust of their government as a result primarily of a history of negative
contact with the criminal justice system;27 and it also disenfranchises a gigantic swath of
the population, as it perpetuates racial differences, embedding them as class differences
within American democracy with a series of steps in the process of incarceration that
forbid re-entry into functioning citizenship.28 By conducting focus groups and field
interviews with hundreds of previously incarcerated citizens, Lerman and Weaver have
given voice to the unenfranchised in American democracy, exposing a massive rift
between the concept and the execution of that ideal.
Marie Gottschalk has also contributed original research to this burgeoning field
with exhaustive research, putting the current administration of the carceral state within
the context of American Political Development explicitly:
The government now exercises vast new controls over millions of people,
resulting in a remarkable change in the distribution of authority since the 1970s in
favor of law enforcement and corrections at the local, state, and federal levels.
Today the United States is the world’s warden, incarcerating a higher proportion
of its people than any other country. The United States has built a carceral state
that is unprecedented among industrialized countries and in U.S. history. The
emergence and consolidation of the U.S. carceral state is a major milestone in
American political development that arguably rivals in signficance the expansion
and contraction of the welfare state in the postwar period[…]The carceral state
has condemned millions of people in the Untied States to “civil death,” denied
core civil liberties and social benefits because of a criminal conviction. An
estimated 6 million people have been disenfranchised either temporarily or
permanently because of criminal conviction. This is about 2.5 percent of the total
U.S. voting-age population, or 1 in 40 adults (Uggen, Shannon, and Manza 2012,
1). Millions of Americans have been denied federal benefits such as public
housing, student loans, and food stamps due to their criminal records. Thanks to a
prior run-in with the law, many people are ineligible to receive state licenses for a
range of occupations--from hairdressing to palm reading to nursing.29
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Gottschalk’s real service to the discipline is not only a perspective on how wildly
out of place the current system is within American political development, but also how
out of step with the rest of the world the United States system is.
Lawrence Bobo and Viktor Thompson’s “Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs,
Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System,” find that African Americans
and white Americans have significantly different views about the criminal justice
system.30 Through an exploration of existing literature, public opinion, new surveys, and
original focus groups, Bobo and Thompson reach this conclusion: “whether focused on
the general character of the criminal justice system or specific sectors of it—such as
judges and the courts, prosecutors, or police—African Americans by and large see a
system suffused with racial bias, and most white Americans do not.”31
Black and white Americans have different perceptions of the criminal justice
systems, which are reinforced by entirely dissimilar probability of contact with the
criminal justice system. Incarceration rates, as will be noted in chapter 4, are entirely
disproportionate toward black offenders. The War on Drugs particularly has had a
negative effect on the black population in the United States, with the population of
incarcerated indviduals skyrocketing from 300,000 to well over 1 million in just twenty
years, from 1980 to 2000, the majority of new inmates being African-American, despite
constituting only 12 percent of the overall population.32
Bobo and Thompson’s work takes a hard look at different perceptions, different
treatment, different sentencing, and different political implications of what they call an
obviously racialized system of incarceration in the United States. Their focus-group
evidence is especially convincing, as it elaborates the narrative that ordinary Americans
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have about the racialized nature of the criminal justice system. It also echoes Smith and
Klinkner’s work in that it calls attention to the inequality in treatment and also in the
perception by whites of a “color-blind” criminal justice system.
Another stream of work looks at the relationship between racial inequality and
social welfare in the United States. Jil Quadagno’s important The Color of Welfare
(1994) traces the origins of social welfare policy from the 1930s and into the post-civil
rights period.33 Quadagno shows how and why blacks and other minorities were excluded
from key provisions of New Deal policy—like workers’ rights and unemployment
insurance, and access to Federal Housing Assistance loans. Not surprisingly, through the
century, African Americans trailed whites in socioeconomic status; and, in the 1960s
when enrolment into Aid With Families With Depenent Children expanded, blacks were
disproportionately represented.34
Robert C. Lieberman, in his seminal book, Shifting the Color Line (1998)
highlights the vast evidence pointing to racial bias within the administration of social
welfare systems in the United States, as well as their association of welfare in the popular
mind with black and brown people.35 Like Quadagno, Lieberman traces the history of the
welfare state in the United States since its purposeful founding in 1935 with the Social
Secuirty Act. He divides his work into three parts, covering, respectively, AFDC (Aid to
Families with Dependent Children, also known commonly as “welfare”), UI
(unemployment insurance), and OASDI (Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance,
commonly known as “social security”).
Lieberman carefully recounts the history in which politicians became obsessed
with alleged fraud and abuse by recipients of welfare. This concern was always
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exaggerated and reflective of deep bias and prejudice against those on assistance. Starting
in the 1960s,
Politicians and administrators, especially at the state and local levels, developed
an obsession with rooting out “fraud” and “abuse” from ADC around this
time….When Americans looked up in the 1960s, they discovered…..that poverty
was still there. But poverty had a very different face from the one it showed
during the Depression, an increasingly black face...Particularly in the great
industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwest, poverty and growing public
assistance rolls were increasingly concentrated among African-Americans who
appeared to be benefitting unworthily from the largesse of politicians who could
manipulate benefits for political gains.36
Lieberman explains that “[t]his newly racialized view of American poverty . . . was far
from accurate, but the institutional structure of ADC left it exposed to political attacks
that raised the stock of such views.” And importantly that
Although the “backlash” against social welfare and civil rights policies is usuallly
attributed to the the splintering of the civil rights movement, the explosion of
racial hosility into violence, and the foundering of the Great Society in the middle
of the decade, race-laden hostility to ADC was already building in the late 1950s
and early 1960s--a “frontlash” as it were--as an outgrowth of ADC’s structural
weakness.37
Lieberman devotes significant attention to the welfare reform—“The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act”— bill signed by Democratic President Bill
Clinton after passage by the Republican Congress. It is widely seen as a compromise bill
at the time, but it was punitive: it ended the federal guarantee of subsidy to poor families
(by imposing a 5-year maximum) and it established work requirements without
guarantees of jobs or job training, child care and other support services. It also ended
automatic enrollment into Food Stamps and Medicaid.
Lieberman asserts without hesitation, “Popular rhetoric and symbolism
surrounding welfare are overwhelmingly negative, and they rely heavily on racial
imagery that is sometimes quite explicit.”38 He is clearly frustrated by the inability of the
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political system that distorts the mission of the welfare system, which is “government
assistance” to those unable to help themselves.39 Instead, “the popular image of welfare
is of a program that pays young, unmarried black women in decrepit, violent, druginfested neighborhoods to have many children by different men, none of whom they
marry. Despite being mostly false….The inner cities feeds the barricade mentality of
white suburbanites, who resent their supposed subsidy of lives they deem pathological.”40
In a word, Lieberman is giving depiction to the white conception of “underclass”
a notion popularized by black sociologist William Julius Wilson and demolished by
political scientist Adolph Reed, Jr.41 The “underclass” was thought to be a segment of the
poor that remained impoverished because of “values” that put it outside the
mainstream—laziness, promiscuity, etc.—and not because of structural inequalities
inherent to capitalism. The extent to which these stereotypes are effectively exploited for
electoral gain is the focus of Chapter 4.
Martin Gilens’ title Why Americans Hate Welfare captures the focus of his
research question. 42 Gilens shows through quantitative and qualitative methods that “
that stereotypes of black welfare recipients are almost twice as strong in predicting
opposition to welfare as are the stereotypes of white welfare recipients . . . Despite the
fact that blacks constitute only 36 percent of all welfare recipients, they clearly dominate
the American public’s thinking about welfare.”43
Further, according to Gilens whites hate “welfare” because they associate it with
the worst stereotypes of African-Americans: “There exists now a widespread perception
that welfare has become a ‘code word’ for race. Although this is too simple a
formulation, I will show that white American’s attitudes toward welfare can only be
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understood in connection with their beliefs about blacks—especially their judgments
about the causes of racial inequality and the extent to which blacks’ problems stem from
their own lack of effort.”44
Gilens explains that these perspectives are not new: “Negative stereotypes of
blacks were used in arguing that slavery was necessary to keep blacks in check, or even
that slavery was in blacks’ own best interest. Because blacks lacked the intelligence,
maturity, or industriousness needed to survive in society, some argued, slavery was a
benefit to both blacks and whites.”45
In sum, the scholarship on racial stereotype and criminal justice policy shows 1)
that stereotypical notions about nonwhites (especially blacks) as criminal and undeserving poor led to over-representation of blacks in prison and hostility to public
subsidy itself in the form of radical public assistance funding cuts; and 2) These public
policy results, in turn, helps reinforce those stereotypical beliefs. These insights are
relevant to this study, as the focus of chapter 4 looks at the use of the “Race Card” in
statewide elections for the governorship in Massachusetts.
Race and City Politics
This study draws on keys insights from scholarship on the history of Boston
politics, and the study of race and urban politics more broadly. Historical studies show
that Boston politics reflected the class and racial/ethnic cleavages that many major cities
experienced. The urban politics literature shows a clear relationship between shifting
racial demographics and partisan voting.
Boston’s remote location makes it, perhaps even more so than New York, the
quintessentially Northeastern city, as its population draws heavily from that region and is
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not at the crossroads of culture and commerce to the extent that New York is. As such,
Boston has a reputation and a history of being sequestered, isolated, and in most respects
self-sufficient in its raison d’etat, that is, education and cultural innovation. The buttoneddown, conservative quality of Boston, however, is still very much part of the story of the
city.46
In some ways it might seem surprising that racial politics would figure
prominently in a city like Boston. There was no vast slavery industry to overcome, and
for much of its history there was not a substantial black population in New England, and
Boston was no different. It was only after the first wave of black migration that the city
became home to a large community of African Americans. Then the policies around the
Federal Housing Administration codified practices of residential segregation that shaped
city demographics for decades thereafter. According to the Fair Housing Center of
Greater Boston, regarding the period of 1934-1968, the generation preceding the one
under study:
The FHA . . . explicitly practiced a policy of “redlining” when determining which
neighborhoods to approve mortgages in. Redlining is the practice of denying or limiting
financial services to certain neighborhoods based on racial or ethnic composition without
regard to the residents’ qualifications or creditworthiness . . .The FHA allowed personal
and agency bias in favor of all white suburban subdivisions to affect the kinds of loans it
guaranteed, as applicants in these subdivisions were generally considered better credit
risks.
In fact, according to James Loewen in his 2006 book Sundown Towns, FHA
publications implied that different races should not share neighborhoods and repeatedly
listed neighborhood characteristics like “inharmonious racial or nationality groups”
alongside such noxious disseminates as “smoke, odors, and fog.”47

It was, however, a combination of the suburbanization of the overall (white)
population and migration of black residents to the region in the 1950s and 1960s that
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solidified the social and thus political boundaries that defined the Boston metropolitan
area:
Between 1960-1965, a significant migration of African Americans to Boston
occurred. This influx was happening at a time when urban renewal was focused
on the rebuilding of Boston’s commercial center, not increasing the supply of
housing. Housing renewal for the urban work force was accomplished by
relocation to the suburbs. Industry followed its managerial and technical staff into
the suburbs, resulting in the white work force fleeing the city, and leaving the city
of Boston to rely upon commuters rather than a resident work force[…]Such
shifts in the locations of employment and housing met neither the needs nor the
skills of the new black residents. By 1970, all of the suburban towns, with the
exception of Cambridge, were 98% white.48

Thus, it is at least relatively well-established in the literature as well as the political
discussion of that racial segregation is the modus vivendi of social and political life in
residential Boston.
When the long-term effects are considered, it is apparent that federal and financial
redlining in communities of color concentrates white and black populations in key areas
of the city for long periods of time. This form of institutional bias creates a path
dependency that carries long-term effects, such as the perpetuation of this segregation.49
The consequences of prior policies that crafted residential segregation extend to other
policy domains, such as employment. As Stephen P. Erie demonstrates in his work
Rainbow’s End, ethnic divisions and their exploitation by politicos explained Boston
politics before the central division involved blacks and whites, when it was between the
ethnic Irish and everyone else.50 As late as the 1950s, “the state Democratic party
continued to be bitterly divided between a western Yankee and a Boston Irish wing.”51
Soon, this prior division within the city changed from Yankee and Irish to white and
nonwhite:
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Southern blacks came to the northern cities in the largest domestic migration in
history. They were soon joined by Hispanics migrating from Puerto Rico,
Mexico, and Latin America. The new migrants demanded the machine’s
traditional benefits--patronage and welfare services. Without the services of the
welfare state, the Irish machines lacked the resources to co-opt blacks and
Hispanics and forestall demands for a greater sharing of the organization’s
lifeblood--power.52
Indeed, Erie discusses the migration of “4 million whites” leaving cities and “5 million
blacks” migrating north.53 This virtually redrew the racial and ethnic maps of cities
within a generation, between 1940 and 1980. It is in this time period that Boston political
elites attempt to build a political “machine” and inadvertently ended up with a higher cost
for the urban welfare state per capita than any other city in the country. 54
If the racial inequalities between whites and nonwhites were ever latent, the
numerous social policies of the 1960s and early 1970s made them manifest. Ronald
Formisiano in Boston Against Busing (2004) demonstrates the enormous impact the
federal decision to mandate school integration had on Boston. Indeed, the history of
school busing in the 1970s is a chilling reminder of the city’s drastic residential and
social segregation.
Formisano’s narrative is an attempt to weave together the history of a sociopolitical phenomenon that saw perhaps the largest-scale attempt to socially integrate
black and white America into one community in American history. Boston seemed to be
the most likely to achieve peaceful success as the home of the Kennedys and the long
history of immigration. Instead, however, South Boston gained a reputation as the
epitome of an antiblack working-class enclave, that employed the tactics of the southern
segregationists when defending its “turf.” It then came as no surprise when George
Wallace and Scoop Jackson, two antibusing candidates for the Democratic presidential
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nomination, won a combined 80 percent of the vote in South Boston during the 1976
Massachusetts Democratic primary.
The city was at the time home to the largest black population in all of the New
England region, in a city that is the engine, the heart, and the epitome of majority-white,
blue-collar and white-collar America. Busing represented a sympolic and tangible
example of federal intervention that upturned the cart of white privilege. This is precisely
why the reaction was so fierce. Formisiano explains the entire phenomenon in his
conclusion:
Many white northerners, especially blue-collar workers, urban ethnics, Catholics,
and union members, who had been Democratic stalwarts, felt threatened in the
1960s by a broad array of social and cultural changes. Many came to see gains
for blacks and other minorities as somehow a diminution of their status and rights.
The white backlash thrived on a sense of politics as a zero-sum game in which the
redressing of wrongs for blacks came to be perceived as a loss for those whites
most socially and geographically proximate to blacks. These fearful whites began
to respond to the appeals of conservative politicians who argued that the civil
rights revolution had gone far enough and who presented themselves as
champions of stability and traditional values.55
The aforementioned works give accounts of the relevant history of Boston that
precedes the period of this study. A different subset of scholarly works in urban studies,
more quantitative in methodology, has also produced relevant insight.
For example, in a work that bridges the gaps between urban studies and
conventional quantitative political science, Richard M. Sauerzopf and Todd Swanstrom
published an article in Urban Affairs Review in 1999 entitled, “The Urban Electorate in
Presidential Elections, 1928-1996.”56 Sauerzopf and Swanstrom have studied what were
the twelve largest cities in the United States back to 1928, and tracked their electoral
developments. They have found that cities have diverged from the national pattern in this
way: they are both more important to Democrats “and more volatile than the

33

conventional wisdom suggests.” They suggests costs to the Democrats’ suburban
strategy, in the form of “declining turnout among potential Democratic voters in the
cities.”57 Sauerzopf and Swanstrom note, “As cities have increasingly deviated from
national voting trends, however, their turnout rates have increasingly fallen behind the
national rates.” They issued a call for researchers to break down the suburban vote and to
examine contextual effects on voting behavior.58
This division of urban and suburban votes is of political significance because, as
Sauerzopf and Swanstrom mention as a marker of the consensus in the field, “The
Democratic Party relied heavily on urban votes to build the New Deal coalition that
dominated national elections from the 1930s to the 1960s. Similarly, the migration
outward from cities to suburbs, which accelerated in the 1950s, fueled the rise to power
of the Republican Party in national elections beginning in 1968 and signaled the
progressive marginalization of urban electorates in national elections.”59
Citywide vote totals and voter registration are both necessary, but not sufficient to
capture this effect. Thanks to a thorough study of city election voting returns, such data
is now readily available for Boston, and so are the neighborhood returns for Boston. A
close study of the city of Boston itself is valuable, as Sauerzopf and Swanstrom can
attest: “Even though the conventional account, described earlier, of the rise and decline of
the urban electorate is widely accepted, there is relatively little published analysis of city
voting trends overtime to back it up. The main reason is that voting statistics in the
United States are reported by county, not by city. Unless the city boundaries correspond
to county boundaries, city election returns are not widely available. Before 1950, county
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voting returns corresponded closely to city returns, but with massive suburbanization
over time, county returns have increasingly deviated from city returns.”60
There are few areas in cities that are truly and in a stable way diverse. A
neighborhood is either moving toward being a black neighborhood, toward becoming a
white neighborhood, toward becoming a Latino neighborhood, or remaining as one of the
former. This segregation can be institutional, but whatever the cause, the effect becomes
political and indeed shapes the politics of the day. Just what shape that politics takes is
the focus of this work and is the focus of much of the urban voting literature as of late.
Zoltan Hajnal and Jessica Trounstine have, for example, in “What Underlies
Urban Politics? Race, Class, Ideology, Partisanship, and the Urban Vote” found that race
is the “dominant factor” in urban elections.61 Through a study of the mayoral elections of
the twenty most populous cities in the United States over the past several decades and
accompanying survey data, Hajnal and Trounstine constructed a pattern of support for
major candidates in these powerful and visible urban elections. Race, perhaps
unsurprisingly, played the major role, even above class and gender, even in nonpartisan
urban elections.
This is even true of “liberal” cities: “More liberal cities were just as racially
divided as less liberal cities. Furthermore, in alternate tests, when we substituted in a
proxy for racial tolerance--the percentage of residents with a college degree—we found
no additional link to the vote.”62 Their findings, thoroughly grounded in empirical data,
are nothing short of stunning in their simplicity and in their implications for the wider
American electorate:
Latinos, whites, and African-Americans are all more apt to vote as a bloc. This
within-group cohesion persists when the candidates in the election are all from the
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same race . . . Cohesion in these single race elections is 69.4% for blacks, 67.5%
for whites, 61.5% for Latinos, and 63.1% for Asian-Americans. Overall, these
results suggest that race is fairly ubiquitous in the urban arena. America’s four
main racial and ethnic groups do represent somewhat cohesive communities.
Mayoral voting is at least in part the story of four different racial and ethnic
groups sorting out their differences.63
By focusing on the urban electorate, Hajnal and Trounstine are making a
statement about American politics in general. The overwhelming majority of each
particular ethnic group gravitates toward the candidate who represents their collective
interest. The division is even starker, by the way, in campaigns wherein the actual
candidates came from two different races or ethnic groups. The contrast is smaller with
white candidates. If, however, a black candidate were to face a white candidate, the
polarization becomes more pronounced. How then can American politics ever be
anything but a sophisticated negotiation between racial and ethnic groups? Their
conclusion is challenging to students of politics of the United States:
Most accounts of politics at the local or national level point to party identification
or ideology as the main driving forces in American politics (Campbell et al. 1960;
Green et al. 2002, Miller and Shanks 1996). But the results presented here suggest
otherwise. Party identification certainly matters. And the ideology greatly helps
to predict vote choice. But in local democracy, it is race more than anything else
that tends to dominate voter decision making.64
Jereon van der Waal, Willem de Koster, and Peter Achterberg, have written an
extremely interesting piece that has potentially wide-ranging significance in analyzing the
racial politics of cities. In “Ethnic Segregation and Radical Right-Wing Voting in Dutch
Cities” the abstract reads:
Our analyses on 50 Dutch cities demonstrate that ethnic segregation leads to PVV
[right-wing] voting, and that this positive effect is stronger in cities with a more
tolerant cultural atmosphere and lower levels of unemployment. This positive
effect is at odds with ethnic threat theory, and our contextualization informed by
the cultural and economic conditions of cities enables distinguishing between
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contact theory and concentration theory. Whereas both predict a positive effect,
only contact theory is corroborated by our results.65
Van der Waal et al. have here made a serious attempt to contribute to the widely
held, historically important view in political science that the “ethnic threat” theory is one
that holds the most explanatory power. Van der Waal et al. cite both the work of V.O.
Key, Mendelberg and Kinder, and other who hold an implied version of the ethnic threat
theory as central to their working models: whites who face blacks in a large-scale
confrontation are those most likely to vote against the best interests of blacks.66
Van der Waal et al. test this theory by using the PVV, a right-wing, antiimmigrant party, as the dependent variable, and in searching for the independent variable,
sees those sectors most likely to vote for the PVV in highly segregated native (Dutch)
neighborhoods in more cosmopolitan, liberal cities.
Conclusion
The aforementioned studies from a range of subfields in political science and
political sociology offer important insights for the present study. Here again are some of
the key points:
1. Race is central to American political development. A large body of scholarship traces
the evolution of political institutions and social policy. Race, class and other forms of
ascriptive status have shaped elite conceptions of citizenship status. It should not
be surprising that appeals to racial stereotypes would be effective in electoral
campaigns.
2. A significant body of survey and experimental research has demonstrated this
centrality. Implicit appeals to anti-black and anti-brown sentiment win white votes
and support.
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3. Racist stereotypes have created disparities in poverty and incarceration, and these
facts inter reinforce popular perceptions. Support for more prisons and tougher
sentencing on one hand, and more restrictive welfare subsidies on the other, are the
direct result of these racial biases.
4. Urban political history and contemporary studies underscore the importance of
residential segregation over time and the continuing salience of race in city elections.
Moreover, as turnout has declined in cities, candidates for office have looked for
ways to secure suburban (more white and affluent) voters and to distance urban ones.
These four general insights are relevant to the study. Boston prides itself on its
cosmopolitanism, but it has been and remains a segregated city, which its politics reflect.
White reaction to policy and protest of the 1960s shaped voting patterns in subsequent
decades.
This study looks principally at neighborhoods in Boston, but also gives attention
to the Greater Boston area. In many respects, it heeds Sauerzopf and Swanstrom’s call.
Chapter 3 examines population shifts and corresponding enrollment and voting change
over time. Like Sauerzopf and Swanstrom, the data is limited insofar as it will show how
the electorate voted at the level of the neigborhood. Thus voting patterns “could be the
result of the characteristics of individual voters who live in cities (e.g., their race or
class), or voting behavior could be due to a ‘contextual effect’ of living within centralcity municipal boundaries.”67
Unlike Sauerzopf and Swanstrom, this study will look at the sorts of campaign
rhetoric that appealed to a sort of “siege” mentality for neighborhoods that were the
center of racial division in the 1970s (and indeed in those suburbs to which those whites
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fled). As will be shown in chapter 4, “resistance” can take the form of opposition not just
to formal and explicit racial integration, but to governmental policies that benefit the outgroup. Nowhere is this resistance more in evidence than in South Boston during the
busing crisis or in (popular) exhortations by Massachusetts politicians to get people “off
the welfare rolls” or “in prison where they belong” during a period of economic hardship.
Finally, it will also become apparent that coded political appeals are the rhetorical
weapon of choice rather than explicitly racial calls to arms, and those codes have served
the political actors well who have employed them.
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CHAPTER 3
RACIAL AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN BOSTON’S NEIGHBORHOODS
Introduction
At midcentury, Boston faced similar challenges that urban municipalities across
the country confronted: a declining industrial base, inadequate housing and social
services, segregated schools: and city and state officials responded in ways common to
that era. Federal programs like “urban renewal,” the War on Poverty, and an ambitious
desegregation policy transformed the social, economic and political landscape.1 The
contested terrain of city politics was the context in which neighborhoods changed in
terms of demographics and ultimately politics. White opposition took the form of “flight”
and change in partisan affiliation from Democratic to Republican in many urban
neighborhoods and suburban municipalities. Central cities, like Boston, became more
Democratic.
These social trends coincided with partisan trends, which manifest in partisan
identification, as well as statewide elections. Local elections in Boston are nonpartisan
affairs, and thus do not lend themselves to unbiased inquiry. However, insight from
urban areas is of particular interest because it sees a much more diverse racial makeup
than the rest of the state, and the racial makeups of the respective neighborhoods tend to
gravitate heavily toward the dominance of either white, black, Hispanic, or Asian
majorities.
This chapter examines the demographic and partisan changes in Boston’s
neighborhoods for the period of this study. It first lays out the historical context that
shaped city politics in the postwar era. It then gives an overview of the sixteen planning
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districts that will be referred to as “neighborhoods” in these pages. Examination of the
demographic, enrollment and voting data is clear: the Republican Party relies on votes
from predominantly white and suburban areas of the city and in specific neighborhoods
of the city. Combined, these sections of Greater Boston formed part of the winning
strategy the Republican party used to successfully elect William Weld in 1990 and 1994,
Paul Cellucci in 1998, and Mitt Romney in 2002. Chapter 4 will subsequently show that
these trends coinceded with the strategies and efforts of the Republican party at the state
level and to employ racially implicit messaging, or “racial conservatism” as a way to
appeal to white urban (and suburban) constituencies.
Historical Overview
Boston underwent major political, social, and economic changes over the last half
century. Mollenkopf gave an account of these in his The Contested City (1983). After
World War II, the city experienced a period of economic expansion coupled with
suburban resettlement. As Judd explains in City Politics (2009), highway development
coupled with government incentives for homebuilding and mortgage loans made the
suburbs a newly attractive area for postwar life. It was not simply that urban life had
changed; it was that a new alternative existed. Simultaneously, black migration from the
southern states was perhaps the greatest movement of labor within national boundaries
within world history. Black workers were met with redlining, subpar housing, and
welfare programs, all of which reinforced of the idea of a less than desirable urban
investment environment.
Government soon attempted to intervene to revitalize urban centers, still the
location of most workplaces and (declining, but still signficant and substantial) votes.
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Initiated under Mayor John Hynes, urban renewal was a federally-subsidized government
policy that sought to increase property values in poor neighborhoods by granting
financial incentives to commercial developers in those neighborhoods. Boston was one of
a number of cities affected by this initiative.2 City politics were also impacted by
President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and Great Society Programs. The
expansion of public housing, government-financed health care, food stamps, and
temporary assistance in the form of welfare benefits were all launched within the same
brief political era when urban flight had been the reality for over twenty years.3
Key to this study from the perspective of race and partisanship was a
desegregation plan launched in Boston public schools in 1974. In that year federal Judge
Arthur Garrity sought to fully implement Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,
Kansas by way of a federal takeover of Boston’s school system. Students were bused
from black neighborhoods (Roxbury, Mattapan) to white neighborhoods (South Boston,
Charlestown), and vice versa, in order to achieve this goal. Chaos ensued. Riots were
provoked by the rhetoric and posture of militant white opponents who stood in front of
high schools. These militant white opponents to desgregation via busing directed violence
against students and the buses in which they came. National media attention became
fixed on the problem as a signal of “white backlash” against the black-white integration
that was the hallmark dream of the Civil Rights Movement. The opposition to busing and
desegration, rooted in the white, Irish, and working class section of South Boston cannot
be overemphasized. This conflict was symbolic of the political tensions, protest
movements, federal policies and court decisions unleashed at the time. Moreover, protest
movements (organized and more inchoate riots and disruptions) and federal intervention
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for civil and economic rights can be seen as a “critical juncture” in the language of
APD—white resentment could thereafter be mobilized in new and different ways.
How this occurred in Boston is clear from an exploration of the sixteen “planning
districts” in the city of Boston over the period of this study. These planning districts,
categorized by the Boston Redevelopment Authority,4 are roughly equivalent to the idea
of “neighborhoods” in other major cities. The Republican Party’s success in gubernatorial
election owes itself to its ability to secure the votes of key neighborhoods within the city.
An examination of Boston’s neighborhoods, their historical makeup, and political
affiliations over time, show how and why this is so.
The Neighborhoods: A Study in Transition, Evolution, and Politics
Yankee Boston: The Back Bay/Beacon Hill and Fenway Neighborhoods
Officially, the Boston Redevelopment Authority designates the Back Bay/Beacon
Hill neighborhood as one planning district, but they consider themselves distinct
neighborhoods. The Back Bay is the larger neighborhood, but Beacon Hill is the most
prominent. It is home to some of the priciest real estate in the city. Notable American
politician John Kerry makes his home on Beacon Hill, in a multimillion dollar
townhouse. Beacon Hill is also home to the Massachusetts State House and its golden
dome, one of the few statehouses in the United States with such notoriety. It is the hill to
which John Winthrop originally referred when making his “Shining City Upon a Hill”
speech with biblical overtones. It is also home to much of the “Freedom Trail” in the
city, a tourist attraction led by expert historians in period attire.
Businesspeople and professionals also call Beacon Hill home, though there is
affordable housing for middle-income residents, as well. As of 2000, nearly 90% of the
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residents of the neighborhood were white, and high in the Fenway, as well. The Fenway
is the location of legendary Fenway Park, home of the Boston Red Sox and symbolically
the epicenter of Bostonian urban life. Interestingly, this is a neighborhood that has
undergone perhaps the least significant demographic change, and yet it is decidedly
experiencing a partisan shift. Yankee Boston used to provide a base for statewide
Republicans, from Governor Francis Sargent and Senator Edward Brooke in the 1970s to
Governor William Weld in the 1990s. Since 2000, however, not one precinct in these
neighborhoods has voted for a Republican in a statewide election. This does not, of
course, foreclose the possibility in the future, but it is notable that Republicans are no
longer drawing their primary urban votes from the wealthiest neighborhoods in the city,
but rather those neigborhoods which have undergone severe conflict and strife which has
racial implications. Republican enrollment in the Back Bay has slightly declined, notably
in the 1970s and early 2000s, while Democratic enrollment increased slightly only in the
1970s.5 The Fenway saw some white decrease in its population in both the 70s and 80s,
and with it, some decline in Republican enrollment. Asian and Latino movement into
both neighborhoods increased over the entire era, but especially in the early 2000s.
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Table 3.1 Back Bay/Beacon Hill
Back Bay/Beacon Hill

1970

1980

1990

2000

2719

2081

2794

3931

Enrollment

3764

4859

5665

6020

White %

0.95

0.9

0.9

0.89

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

Table 3.2 Fenway/Kenmore
Fenway/Kenmore

1970

1980

1990

2000

Republican Enrollment

1429

816

891

1173

Democratic Enrollment

2530

2015

3014

3858

.87

.80

.72

.69

White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

The South End
The South End has long been an area that is supposed to be Boston’s case study in
urban renewal and “gentrification.” And, as Thomas H. O’Connor explains, that
gentrification has had an impact on the larger Boston sphere, making what was once a
majority-minority neighborhood in 1970 majority white by 2000. The process began in
1954:
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When the Hynes administration demolished the New York Streets section of the
South End back . . . displaced tenants were forced to look for other places to live.
Most white families went into housing projects in South Boston, Dorchester, and
Jamaica Plain; African-American and Puerto Rican families moved to
Washington Park and North Dorchester. A number of these black families
moved across into northern Mattapan, a neighborhood considered to be the
largest Jewish community in New England.6

Mollenkopf also emphasized the South End as a case study in urban renewal.
Mollenkopf writes:
Boston’s South End redevelopment area, rated at $37 million in public money,
ranks among the top three residential projects and has also displaced thousands of
people….In Boston, renewal in the South End was designed to produce
“maximum upgrading,” to use Edward Logue’s words, in a housing stock
adjacent to the [Central Business District], a hospital complex, and the newer
office developments in the Back Bay. Other large Boston renewal projects
cleared land near Massachusetts General Hospital, for a new Government Center
office complex, and for the Prudential Life Insurance Company.7
From the beginning, the South End was a concentrated effort to expand the central
business district that had the consequence of transforming the demographic makeup of
the neighborhood. This took massive institutional intervention, however; and again these
development efforts seem to explain the counter-trend of white influx as opposed to flight
since the South End saw an overall 50% increase in the white population from 1970 to
2000.8 During this time Republican enrollment increased a total of over 60%.9 The
black population, meanwhile, declined by over 33% and Democratic enrollments fell.
The South End is now a choice neighborhood marked by high real estate prices. It is
geographically closest to both the Back Bay and Beacon Hill areas, where the capital
buildings sit and the wealthy historically and presently reside. As early as the 1980s,
residents of surrounding areas began accusing South End and Back Bay residents of wish
to create a “silk-stocking district” similar to the Upper East Side of Manhattan.10 The
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South End is an example of the counter-trend that is thought to be occurring now in cities
across the United State whereby the white middle class is returning to central cities and
providing support for the Democratic party.
Table 3.3 South End
South End

1970

1980

1990

2000

957

742

1168

1692

3692

4065

5625

6781

.40

.35

.40

.45

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

Central Boston: North End, the West End, and Chinatown
The West End saga is, like that of the South End, a story best told comprhensively
in Mollenkopf’s work, The Contested City. The upshot, however, is that the formerly
sprawling neighborhood known as the West End in Boston is today no more than an
afterthought of a few hundred residences in metropolitan Boston. It covers one precinct in
Central Boston.11
The North End, however, is the oldest continuous settlement in North America. It
was for a time “Boston proper”, and is adjacent to Beacon Hill and Fanuil Hall, the
much-vaunted and tourist-ridden Quincy Market. It is home to the Old North Church, a
site of heritage from the American Revolution, where the Bicentennial with President
Gerald Ford and Queen Elizabeth II was celebrated in 1976. It is also Boston’s Little
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Italy. According to Steven Puleo in his recent work, The Boston Italians: “Even as late as
1980, the North End’s population was about 60 percent Italian American (the figure is
under 40 percent today), and it retained its character, reputation, and heritage as one of
the nation’s best-known Italian neighborhoods.”12
Italian-Americans in New England, from Saugus to Pittsfield, Massachusetts see
the North End as the Old Neighborhood. Whites, including a plurality of ItalianAmerican whites, make up the majority in the North End, and it has experienced
revitalization thanks to an even more involved urban development project, the Central
Artery or Big Dig project. The Big Dig was essentially supposed to bury a stretch of
elevated highway under the North End underground instead. The major component was
to remove the highway in order to encourage pedestrian traffic and ease auto traffic, and
it seems to have been largely successful in those goals. The North End is also one of the
friendliest enclaves in the city to Republican candidates for governor in the last four
decades. It is worth noting that the Italian population, until the 1970s, had been
historically a largely Democratic constituency, but that began to change in the post-1960s
era. This neighborhood threw its support overwhelmingly to Republican candidate, and
Italian-American, Paul Cellucci.
The change of the percentage of Asian residents in the various neighborhoods is
associated with most neighborhoods in Boston. In no neighborhood do they constitute a
majority. However, in Chinatown, which is no more than a few precincts within Central
Boston, Asian residents comprise roughly 60% of the population (which itself is roughly
5,000 whereas most neighborhoods average 30,000), which is not a major change over
the past several decades.

51

Overall Central Boston has seen a 60% population increase over the last four
decades, owing to a large influx of minority residents, while its white population has also
slightly increased. Its Democratic enrollment has fallen slightly, as well, notably in the
1990s, the same time of Republican resurgence, possibly indicating a permanent shift of
allegiance in the rightward direction.
Table 3.4 Central Boston
Central

1970

1980

1990

2000

708

1088

1718

2989

6154

6928

7021

7614

.89

.79

.74

.70

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

The Second Ward: Charlestown
Historical site of the revolutionary battle site of Bunker Hill, Charlestown is now
and has been the home to a working-class mix of residents of Irish and Italian ancestry
that has seen some Latino settlement in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Home
to the Charlestown Navy Yard, a historical place of employment but now a testament to
the endless experimentation in the spirit of urban renewal, Charlestown is geographically
isolated from the rest of the city, not the least of which because it is bounded by the
Charles and Mystic Rivers, making it one of the more notable peninsulas in the region. It
has also been the site of continuous efforts at renewal by the Boston Redevelopment
Authority, which remains a large landowner within the neighborhood. Perhaps no one
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description of the neighborhood is more apt than Ronald Formisiano’s in Boston Against
Busing:
Treated partly as a dumping-ground for institutions unwanted elsewhere,
Charlestown had been closed in by ugly steel and concrete bridges and highways
built mainly for the convenience of others, and a noisy, elevated railway had been
thrust through its heart. In the 1930s bulldozers made way for a large housing
project, over the screams of many of those displaced, and by the 1960s the project
had deteriorated into a cauldron of social disorganization. In the 1970s it would
provide militant antibusing leaders and many young street
warriors….Charlestown qualified perhaps even more as an urban village, with
fifteen to seventeen thousand persons packed into one square mile of a hilly
peninsula. Over the years Italians and others had moved in and intermarried with
the predominant Irish Catholics, so that everybody was related to everybody else.
Thus loyalty to “Our Town” transcended anything necessarily Irish or
Catholic….13

In Charlestown itself, which is slightly smaller than the others (about 15,000
residents), an interesting phenomenon can be observed. The white population dropped by
roughly 2,000, and the combined black, Latino, and Asian populations increased by
roughly 3,000, but the Republican enrollment increased from 100 to 1,400. This does not
appear to be superficial enrollment, either. There is a definite uptick in Republican
strength in voting support for mayor, governor, and president from 1964 to 2008 in
Charlestown.
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Table 3.5 Charlestown
Charlestown

1970

1980

1990

2000

177

286

752

1625

6279

5673

5788

5416

.98

.98

.95

.79

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

East Boston: A New Latino-Majority Community
East Boston is formerly home to the working-class district of Italian-Americanism
and has evolved into the only majority-Latino neighborhood in the city, at 53% of its
residents as of 2010. Like every neighborhood with majority-white students experiencing
integrated school busing, East Boston was the site of political and social conflict. East
Boston, for most of the twentieth century, was an outpost of Italian-American culture that
rivaled the North End, but was home certainly to more working-class residents. It too was
the site of antibusing riots simply because it was at the center of the controversy; and, at
roughly the same time, the new Logan International Airport expansion was undertaken
over residents’ objections.
East Boston subsequently became home to thousands of Latino immigrants,
beginning in the 1980s, when over 5,000 new Latino residents found new homes in the
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neighborhood. In the 1990s and 2000s, 10,000 and 7,000 new residents moved in,
respectively, to the point now where East Boston is majority Latino, a majority with
Mexican ancestry. There are some Salvadoran and Puerto Rican communities, as well,
but East Boston is socially and politically a Latino-majority community, and that
community is predominantly Mexican or Mexican-American. Before and during the
transition, East Boston was a reliably or at least reasonably Republican stronghold, but
now that status is relegated to some of the outer precincts, which still hold a large nonHispanic white majority (and perhaps Italian ancestry, although that precise data is
unavailable). East Boston saw its Latino population rise from 600 to 21,000, but again,
its Republican enrollment shifted by only 400. Formerly friendly to Republican
candidates for governor, it has experienced low turnout in recent years and usually
provided proof that the Latino electorate in Massachusetts is solidly in the Democratic
column.
Table 3.6 East Boston
East Boston

1970

1980

1990

2000

694

601

736

1089

17834

15295

13872

15111

.97

.97

.76

.51

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.
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South Boston
“Southie” is perhaps the epitome of the popular perception of Boston as the
working-class Irish urban ghetto and is still home to some Irish settlement. It was at the
epicenter of the Boston Busing controversy. Irish Catholics form at least the plurality, if
not the majority, of South Boston residents, and the neighborhood has the smallest
nonwhite population in Boston. It was, not unfairly, the neighborhood that symbolizes
one of the most visible racial conflicts in the post-civil rights era. The culture and the
politics have informed each other in familiar and unfortunate ways—giving it a unique
political and socioeconomic profile.
Indeed, while South Boston has undergone some wealthy investment and hence
gentrification, it is surprisingly still home to a largely white, working-class population, so
much so that less than 5% of the population is black14. Politically, South Boston has
formed the cornerstone or base for one of the two major candidates for mayor in virtually
every election since 1967, as much as it has for Republican candidates for governor or
president during that era. It is the largest, most reliable Republican bastion, even voting
for Reagan in the 1980 and 1984 presidential elections and providing precinct victories
for Republican candidates through 2002, the only exception being the vote for
conservative Silber in 1990. Along with Charlestown, the white population has remained
stable, but a combination of high Democratic disenrollment and significant Republican
enrollment increase has made for a more fertile environment for Republican competition.

56

Table 3.7 South Boston
South Boston

1970

1980

1990

2000

654

1295

1274

1893

18419

13780

13028

12687

.97

.98

.95

.85

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

West Roxbury: Suburb of Dedham
As a “streetcar suburb” West Roxbury has long had a conflicting identity both
within and outside the city of Boston. It has a Protestant past, but is now home largely to
the white ethnic (Irish) as well as Jewish community, and over the past twenty years, has
also seen a significant Latino and Asian residential movement.15
West Roxbury is and has been for over half a century, a largely white, Catholic
community adjacent to the wealthy suburb of Dedham, and in many respects it is visually
and architecturally indistinguishable. Administratively, however, both Dedham and West
Roxbury are served by the Dedham and Boston City school districts, respectively, and are
accountable to different municipal governments.
West Roxbury has historically been a majority-non-Hispanic white neighborhood
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that has often acted as part of the base of any successful Republican candidate in Boston.
It is nearly as reliable in both respects as South Boston. Residents of West Roxbury could
be counted on to provide majorities for Reagan, Weld, and Cellucci, and when the
neighborhood began to experience some demographic change, there were still precincts
within the neighborhood that turned out for Romney in 2002. West Roxbury, perhaps
more than any neighborhood, is still culturally and even politically suburban in
character16. West Roxbury saw the greatest degree of Democratic decline as a proportion
of the neighborhood’s electorate. Its Republican base is still relatively stable, despite the
movement of new minority residents.
Table 3.8 West Roxbury
West Roxbury

1970

1980

1990

2000

1985

1712

1597

3359

14434

13871

11830

10729

0.99

0.97

0.94

0.84

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

Ward 18 Neighbors: Hyde Park and Mattapan
Like West Roxbury, Hyde Park has a largely Yankee Protestant past, but like
many neighborhoods bordering Roxbury, it has seen a transformation from white
majority to black plurality over the past four decades.
In the adjoining neighborhoods of Hyde Park and Mattapan, the process has been
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a slow but steady one, in which black residents have begun to form a majority, first in
Mattapan, and now certainly in Hyde Park. White residents have moved out in droves, as
many as ten thousand per decade in these neighborhoods, each with roughly thirty
thousand residents.
As O’Connor notes about Mattapan:
Between 1968 and 1970, some three thousand African-American
families entered Mattapan, moving along Blue Hill Avenue from
Grove Hall toward Mattapan Square. By 1972, the number of
Jewish residents in the area had dropped to fewer than twenty-five
hundred, and the subsequent flare-up of racial fears, panic selling,
and blockbusting accelerated the exodus of Jewish families to the
point where a once predominantly Jewish community was
transformed into an almost all-black neighborhood. (O’Connor,
241)

For Hyde Park, the neighborhood is perhaps one of the best test cases for the
linkage between political and demographic change, as it was on the “frontier” of the
busing crisis. Many wealthy parents sent their children to private school to avoid the
desgregation effort17:
Hyde Park saw its black population increase from 100 to 15,000 (again, out of a
population of 30,000) and a concomitant white decrease, and thus did Hyde Park begin to
undergo a racial transformation. Hyde Park saw its proportion of black residents steadily
increase from 7 percent in 1980 to 41 percent in 2000, with over 12,000 black residents in
the 30,000 resident neighborhood. Meanwhile, white residents constituted over 95
percent of the neighborhood in 1970, when the population numbered almost 40,000,
while in 2000 the white population was 13,00018.
Mattapan more quickly became a black-majority neighborhood although by 1970
there was already a substantial black population that was still in the minority. During the
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ensuing decade, 20,000 white residents moved out of the neighborhood, and 10,000 black
residents moved in. Since that time, the neighborhood has maintained roughly an 80%
black population, while the non-Hispanic white population has shrunk to below 5% as of
2000. Hyde Park and Mattapan, adjacent to one another, now together occupy most of
Ward 18 in Boston, which is fully now a black majority ward, but was majority white in
197019.
Despite the large number of new black residents, Hyde Park had seen three
decades of declining Democratic enrollment in the 1970s through the 1990s. It was not
until the 2000s that Hyde Park began to see an uptick in Democratic enrollment.
Mattapan, has actually seen its Democratic enrollment decline overall, particularly in the
1990s.
Table 3.9 Hyde Park
Hyde Park

1970

1980

1990

2000

1205

1080

1015

1192

13518

10746

9039

9310

.99

.85

.72

.43

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, City of Boston and U.S. Census Reports from the
Boston Redevelopment Authority.
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Table 3.10 Mattapan
Mattapan

1970

1980

1990

2000

890

759

277

490

10675

4707

6013

8159

.55

.15

.08

.04

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

Roxbury
Roxbury has always been the heart of Boston’s black population. It grew simply
because of redlining in the early part of the 20th Century (see chapter 2), and by 1970, it
was home to a majority of the black population in Boston, which in absolute terms is the
largest concentration of black people in Massachusetts.
Roxbury in the 1970s was at the heart of what the Boston Globe in the 1970s
called “the black wards” as an indicator, perhaps, but decidedly an unfortunate choice of
words. The proportion of black residents has declined significantly in the last forty years,
from three-quarters of the nearly 70,000 residents in 1970 to just a bare majority of
56,000 residents in 2000, a net decline of nearly 20,000 black residents— a drop of over
forty percent, in thirty years. The movement of the black population is not unlike the
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movement of other ethnic populations, but is perhaps more visible and more thoroughly
catalogued. William E. Nelson also notes in his case study of Boston and Liverpool20
that while Roxbury has been the site of numerous radical protests over the years—such as
the 1967 welfare mothers sit-in that ultimately gained them positive attention from a
Republican governor—it is not a neighborhood where organized political activity has
been consistent, say, for example, in terms of voter mobilization.21 Subsequently, the
racial composition began to markedly shift:
In Boston, the continued movement southward of the Black
population has resulted in the concentration of Black residents in
Roxbury and Mattapan. Blacks constituted the overwhelming
majority of residents in bot of these communities in 1990, 72
percent in Roxbury, and 82 percent in Mattapan…Boston’s racial
composition is changing at a rapid clip. The predominant trend is
the decline of the White population and the remarkable growth of
Black and immigrant populations. Between 1950 and 1980,
Boston’s White population declined from 95 percent to 70 percent;
across these same years, the Black and minority population climed
from 5 percent to 30 percent.22
Roxbury is the only neighborhood that saw a significant increase in Democratic
enrollment as a proportion of registered voters. The Latino movement into Roxbury
almost directly supplements the black exodus, with nearly 15,000 new Latino residents
since 1970.
Table 3.11 Roxbury
Roxbury

1970

1980

1990

2000

Republican Enrollment

1190

1142

327

402

Democratic Enrollment

13820

9401

13634

17240

.18

.08

.06

.05

White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.
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Dorchester: North and South
The neighborhood of Dorchester, comprising the planning districts of North
Dorchester and South Dorchester, reflects perhaps the greatest degree of diversity in the
city. This is partly due to its size, as together it is certainly the largest neighborhood in
the city of Boston in terms of population, at roughly 100,000 residents out of 600,000 in
the city. It has been thus since its absorption by the city of Boston over a century ago.
Dorchester was a working-class outskirt of the city of Boston until the Great Migration,
and the turn-of-the century saw a decidedly Irish white majority in the neighborhood,
both north and south. Students were bused into Dorchester as well, and, at the start of the
1970s, it was decidedly a white-majority neighborhood. There has been no particular
growth or seismic political change in Dorchester during this time, only that it was the site
of much of Roxbury’s black out-migration and the settling point for much of what has
become Boston’s increasingly foreign-born population. North Dorchester has gone from
just over 80% non-Hispanic white to about 45% non-Hispanic white in the 1970-2000
era, and South Dorchester has seen its black population increase from only one-tenth to a
plurality of the neighborhood, at just over 40%, in 2010. Yet South Dorchester has
retained its 1500 (give or take a few) enrolled Republicans during that entire period,
fluctuating a bit but remaining at that level.
North Dorchester has actually increased its number of enrolled Republicans from
700 to about 900. Yet, to note actual Republican political strength in North Dorchester in
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regular elections is perhaps more accurate of a picture, rather than just depicting random
Republican presence that constitutes 1% of the population. As the white population is
now just over one-third what it once was (under 10,000 rather than over 27,000), so is the
average Republican vote roughly one-third of what it was in the early 1970s (1500 rather
than 5,000).
South Dorchester, similarly, has seen its Republican strength in gubernatorial
elections decline from over 10,000 in the late 1960s and early 1970s to an average of
perhaps 4,000 in the last two decades, while its white population has seen a drop of
nearly half, as well. It would appear that in this neighborhood, if both are counted
together as one neighborhood, that there is a relationship between the waning of
Republican strength and white flight.
Table 3.12 North Dorchester
North Dorchester

1970

1980

1990

2000

669

590

547

879

13428

7453

6559

7494

.83

.67

.53

.36

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.
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Table 3.13 South Dorchester
South Dorchester

1970

1980

1990

2000

1567

1292

1124

1600

22900

16486

15556

13863

.88

.65

.48

.30

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

Allston-Brighton
Allston-Brighton, home to Boston University, is home to the largest student
population in the city of Boston. It is also convenient (across the Charles River) to
Cambridge, home of Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
so the student and faculty population is quite high relative to other areas of the city. The
historic neighborhoods of Allston and Brighton now share the planning district of
Allston-Brighton, and the boundaries between the two are just as subjective as any of the
other boundaries of the city. Allston-Brighton does lie at the outskirts of the city, and yet
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is more accessible from the central districts than any of the outer neighborhoods such as
Hyde Park, Jamaica Plain, Dorchester, or West Roxbury.
The neighborhood of Allston/Brighton saw an ethnically Asian population
increase from just over 1,000 to 10,000 from 1970 to 2000, and saw its Republican
enrollment rise slightly, from 2700 to 4200. Its white population had dropped by about
5,000. Allston-Brighton, which occupies Wards 21 and 22 in the city, has seen the
greatest degree of Asian population increase. However, it has been a very slow
progression, and Asians still comprise only 10% of the neighborhood. Marked increases
occurred in the 1980s, when the Asian population doubled from 3,000 to 6,000, and it has
only increased marginally ever since in the neighborhood of 70,000 residents. Most of the
new immigrants in the 1980s were of Chinese descent. It has served as a bedrock of
support for candidates like former mayoral candidate Sam Yoon, an Asian-American who
saw many of his votes come from Allston-Brighton. It now has more residents of Asian
descent than Chinatown in Boston, but in no precinct in Allston-Brighton is there a
majority of Asian residents. It has always had a white majority, and supplied the margin
for many victories of Republicans throughout the 1960s and 1970s, even constituting the
base of support in some elections.
An interesting phenomenon is the low voter turnout relative to the rest of the city
and especially the lower turnout in state and local elections, that is, those elections not
directly having bearing on a presidential election. This is partly why Republicans can win
in this neighborhood. Allston-Brighton has seen an 18% overall decline in Democratic
enrollment from 1970 to 2010, and a 2% overall Republican drop, remaining relatively
stable. The total white population has declined slightly, by about 5%, but the newer
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Asian population has more than compensated for that migration difference in this
prosperous, bustling neighborhood.

Table 3.14 Allston-Brighton
Allston-Brighton

1970

1980

1990

2000

2795

2069

2336

4229

Enrollment

19036

15575

14206

16779

White %

0.82

0.8

0.73

0.69

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

Jamaica Plain and Mission Hill
The Boston Redevelopment Authority has struggled to set the boundaries of study
and neighborhood designation for both the Jamaica Plain and Mission Hill
neighborhoods. Jamaica Plain, in neighborhood boundaries set by the BRA from 1970 to
2000, is roughly coterminous with what many residents now call “Mission Hill.” For the
purposes of this study, Jamaica Plain is defined demographically by the BRA (19702000), and, in fact, many in the city familiar with the BRA’s boundaries believe most of
what BRA has drawn as Jamaica Plain actually belongs in Mission Hill. For the purposes
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of consistency and to leave this particular matter to future, more specific research, the
two have been combined in the election results that have been tallied and referred to
jointly as “Jamaica Plain.”
Both areas, have undergone waves of demographic change through the years.
What was once a parochial Irish neighborhood for a time became home to many Latino
immigrants and is now seeing an increase in the white population. Indeed in the 2000s,
however, Jamaica Plain, was subject to rapid “gentrification.” The white share of the
population increased as a percentage of the total by 17 points. Because it is within the
city limits and reasonably close to the Back Bay, with many freestanding homes as well
as apartment buildings along its main streets, college-age students have contributed to a
relatively bohemian culture in both Jamaica Plain and Mission Hill. A significant
Democratic enrollment increase also occurred during this decade. Over the course of the
entire era, both Democratic and Republican enrollment declined by over 10 percent,
while the white population declined by nearly half.
These cases bring into stark relief the idea that, contrary to merely looking at the
progression of a neighborhood over the entire era, some neighborhoods, such as Jamaica
Plain, saw racial changes of different character over different decades. For instance,
black residents increased as a share of the population in the 1970s, and Latino residents in
both the 1970s and the 1980s, but in neither of these cases was there any significant party
identification change associated with the racial change.
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Table 3.15 Jamaica Plain
Jamaica Plain

1970

1980

1990

2000

1698

1330

1134

1389

14784

10146

11263

12885

.78

.59

.49

.36

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Massachusetts Election Statistics, Boston
Redevelopment Authority.

Roslindale
Like South Boston, East Boston, and West Roxbury, Roslindale counted itself a
“defended neighborhood” during the Boston busing crisis of the 1970s. It was a
neighborhood on the outskirts of Boston with an ethnic white majority but soon saw that
population decline. A significant white exodus occurred throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and
1990s. In fact, the absolute number of the white population is down 58% from its height
in 1970 in Roslindale. Later, in the 1990s and 2000s, Latino in-migration began to
repopulate the neighborhood. Surprisingly, there was relatively little Democratic decline,
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in any of those eras of white exodus, and Republican enrollment stayed virtually the
same.

Table 3.16 Roslindale
Roslindale

1970

1980

1990

2000

1411

995

1017

1288

12074

10642

8529

9129

.96

.91

.77

.56

Republican
Enrollment
Democratic
Enrollment
White %

Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, City of Boston and U.S. Census Reports
from the Boston Redevelopment Authority.

Reflections on the Neighborhoods of Boston
After the Civil Rights era, no decade saw a neighborhood with a significant
decrease in either the Latino or Asian populations, but not so with the white and black
populations. White population decrease is associated with virtually every racial change
in Boston during this era, but concerning declines in the black population, only in one
neighborhood was there significant racial change in multiple decades: Roxbury in the
1980s, which saw a concurrent significant racial increase for Latino residents.
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Several interesting trends that are worth noting. Findings of association between
Boston neighborhoods in terms of party identification change and racial change, coupled
with the larger national and regional trends regarding racial attitudes among political
party identifiers, seems to point to a certain consistency. Namely, a consistency exists
within party ideology that would suggest identification and even voter registration with a
political party is heavily associated with attitudes regarding race. Thus, the formation of
governmental policy exists alongside a local experience of changing neighborhood
demographics.
By breaking the city of Boston into its constituent neighborhoods, certain trends
quickly become evident in those micro-polities. The starkest demographic change is
captured in Map 3 and Map 4, found in the Appendices. The first (“Map 3”) shows 1970s
data on neighborhoods and the degree to which they are majority white or plurality or
majority nonwhite. In the 1970s only Roxbury and South End were mostly nonwhite,
whereas in by 2000 there was a significant racial change that seems to have occurred. By
2000, racial and ethnic demographics in the city of Boston was transformed. By then, the
South End was majority white, and Jamaica Plain, North Dorchester, South Dorchester,
Mattapan and Hyde Park were nonwhite.23 Party identification trends and the racial
trends within the city can and should be studied in conjunction. The entire data set of
Republican share of the two-party gubernatorial vote by neighborhood in the post-Civil
Rights Era is posted below. The largest and most consistent difference is between South
Boston and Roxbury. This is true especially when the Republican and Democratic sides
of a campaign mark a stark departure from articulating the interests of the neighborhood
from one election to the next. In no other neighborhoods are there as many joint
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fluctuations of partisan support there are in these two. Southie and Roxbury are perhaps
bounded by race more than any other neighborhoods in Boston. Roxbury is the historic
home, as noted above, of Boston’s black population. Southie was the site of racial
violence and national attention in the 1970s. It is those neighborhoods which became the
focal point of racial politics statewide during the ensuing decades. The identification of
the interests of either neighborhood became central, rhetorically and strategically, to the
campaigns of both major parties. It may even be said, in the language of American
Political Development, that the explicit racial identification of both neighborhoods in the
early 1970s could be classified as a critical juncture in the political development of
Massachusetts, ensuring a path dependence of continuous racialized political
development for the remainder of the era.
In Table 3.17, the entire Republican share of the major-party vote, by
neighborhood, is listed throughout the post-Civil Rights era. Roxbury, the Back
Bay/Beacon Hill neighborhood, and South Boston are themselves worthy of attention.
They are the pillars of consistency as well as the surrogates for the black, wealthy, and
working-class white votes, respectively. For instance, there often is a stark shift
especially in these places toward one candidate or another, but also note the patterns that
emerge: after 1990, South Boston became a consistent Republican stronghold, which it
never had been before.
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Table 3.17 Republican Share of Two-Party Massachusetts Gubernatorial Vote, By
Neighborhood, 1970-200224

70

74

78

82

86

90

94

98

02

Back Bay

.66

.56

.82

.33

.25

.62

.68

.47

.53

Fenway

.61

.62

.64

.27

.18

.55

.57

.29

.32

Central

.50

.59

.47

.36

.27

.56

.68

.51

.45

W.Roxbury

.68

.50

.29

.44

.39

.42

.65

.50

.50

South End

.46

.56

.74

.21

.17

.52

.58

.31

.32

S.Boston

.52

.41

.17

.48

.36

.29

.65

.57

.45

Allston

.55

.45

.51

.23

.19

.46

.60

.35

.37

East Boston

.45

.37

.32

.33

.29

.44

.68

.58

.45

Hyde Park

.64

.44

.25

.37

.34

.42

.64

.43

.35

Charlestown

.42

.41

.20

.34

.27

.39

.56

.50

.50

Roslindale

.62

.42

.28

.36

.29

.41

.60

.41

.34
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Jamaica P.

.57

.47

.39

.29

.22

.47

.48

.26

.22

N.Dorchester

.53

.42

.27

.30

.24

.37

.53

.35

.28

Mattapan

.50

.55

.59

.09

.12

.33

.45

.17

.12

S.Dorchester

.59

.44

.26

.33

.26

.34

.57

.39

.30

Roxbury

.29

.70

.73

.07

.07

.37

.48

.19

.17

Several phenomena emerge during this era: Many neighborhoods have seen a
severe percentage (proportional) decline in Democratic enrollment, and all but a few have
seen an absolute decline in that enrollment. A few have seen significant increases in
Republican enrollment. Only a very few have seen a very significant decrease in
Republican party identification enrollment during that time period, and those
neighborhoods have some interesting commonalities which would seem to indicate an
uptick in Republican identification in the city with a new type of voter who had been
traditionally Democratic. The rest seem to fit into the pattern of increasing nonpartisan
enrollment, suggesting many causes that currently are hotly debated in political science,
but which will only be studied here within the context of the Boston case. Below, the
table demonstrates the consistency of Republican support for virtually all offices,
juxtaposed with the inconsistent participation and support of Democratic voters for their
candidates. This appears to be less of a trend toward independent voting than simply a
case of two very diferent standards of participation among supporters of the two major
parties.
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Table 3.18
Average partisan turnout (among selected competitive elections) in overall
citywide election, 1970-2010 (in thousands)25
President

Governor

Mayor*

Republican

54

55

50

Democratic

136

86

71

*Republican-leaning candidates coded by author, Boston mayoral elections non-partisan.
As is plain in the above table, the vote did not vary more than 5-10% among
Republican candidates26 in competitive elections. Democrats, however, had a more
difficult time retaining a victorious coalition. In presidential elections, the average
Democratic turnout was as high as 136,000 votes, but could garner as many as 200,000
votes or as little as 95,000. Democrats were good for roughly 70,000 votes on average in
the Governor’s race, but could range from 50,000 to 110,000. In mayoral elections, when
often the city Democratic party would back a candidate and interests more aligned with
the Republian party may back another candidate, the split was more even.
Conclusion
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Many of these neighborhoods hosted similar patterns and can reasonably be
grouped into several main categories: South Boston, West Roxbury, and Charlestown
were and remain white ethnic majority, working-class neighborhoods, which in the past
were Democratic-leaning and have grown to form the new base of the Republican party.
The Back Bay/Beacon Hill, the Fenway, the North End, and Allston-Brighton are all still
majority white, center-city neighborhoods of some affluence that did constitute the
Republican base in the city, but now operate more as swing vote districts that may tilt
Republican in some elections. Roxbury and the South End are historically majority-black
neighborhoods which have seen a migration of their black population out in favor of
Latino, Asian, and white movement. East Boston, Jamaica Plain, and Roslindale are all
historically working-class white neighborhoods at the outskirts of the city that now are
home to large Latino populations, in one case a majority, but still with a relatively large
white plurality in the other two. Hyde Park, Dorchester and Mattapan have all shifted
from majority white to majority or plurality black neighborhoods gradually over the
course of this era. This typology reveals several phenomena: the shifting character of
racial makeup of many of the neighborhoods in the city, the accompanying shift in
partisan dynamics in the city from a relatively competitive Republican-Democratic twoparty system to a strong Democratic party presence, while seeing the suburban-focused
Republican party compete only seriously in working-class white areas with a history of
racial conflict. Residual Republican support may still come from the wealthier, white
majority neighborhoods.
Many of the same patterns still persist in Boston politics, as we can see from the
enrollment data: white residents leaving or entering a neighborhood has a determinative
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effect on Republican enrollment, minority participation has not historically been as high
as white voter participation, and Democratic enrollment has been declining everywhere.
Because of the abundance of focus on the “new Boston” in demographic data in the past
several decades, these truths remain. The four main demographic groups of the city may
fluctuate in number and may indeed trade numerical dominance of neighborhoods, but
one fact seems to remain: residential segregation of these neighborhoods is not a relic of
the past, but an ongoing concern of the present that will necessitate political coalitionbuilding and consensus rather than conflict.
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CHAPTER 4
MASSACHUSETTS ELECTIONS: CRIME, WELFARE, AND RACE
Republican candidates for state once offered a moderate brand of conservatism,
and in the immediate post-civil rights era they were able to garner a substantial number of
votes within the city. By the 1990s that was no longer the case. This chapter will chart the
development of racial conservatism in the campaign rhetoric of a number of key elected
officials from the 1970s through 2002. The relatively moderate conservatism of Senator
Edward Brooke and Governor Francis W. Sargent is replaced, by the early 1990s, with
racial conservatism. The role of national figures, especially Reagan, is considered. The
campaign speeches and administration speeches are from all Republican governors
elected in Massachusetts after 1970, including William Weld in (1990 and 1994), Paul
Cellucci (1998), and Mitt Romney (2002) all of which illustrate the importance of racial
conservatism to state politics.1
The Decline of Moderate Racial Liberalism
Francis W. Sargent was elected Lieutenant Governor of Massachusetts in 1966 on
the same ticket with incumbent Governor John Volpe. This was, incidentally, the first
election for a full four-year term as governor of Massachusetts. For almost two centuries,
governors in the Bay State had been elected to two-year terms. Now, all elections for
Massachusetts governor would coincide with presidential “midterm” elections. Sargent
was on the Republican ticket for the first three of these elections, and in the latter two he
was the official standard-bearer of the Republican party. Volpe had previously held the
office in 1961, and, presumably as a reward for helping Nixon win the state in the 1968
presidential election, Volpe was appointed and confirmed as the president’s Secretary of
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Transportation, putting Sargent in the driver’s seat as acting governor. Sargent would
soon run for election and win in his own right in 1970.
Also in 1966, Edward W. Brooke, the first African-American elected statewide
official in Massachusetts political history as Attorney General, was elected to a full term
in the United States Senate from the Bay State to replace retiring Republican Leverett
Saltonstall. Brooke won a bruising primary but assembled a coalition that relied on the
traditional white Yankee Republican base in the city of Boston and the suburbs and rural
areas across the state but which was also inclusive of virtually every majority-black
neighborhood in the city of Boston. He kept this coalition throughout his tenure in office
though it weakened enough for his marginal defeat in 1978.
Brooke and Sargent had a remarkable degree of agreement, and as a team, it
seemed their only areas of significant disagreement were rooted in the primacy of their
respective levels of government (federal and state), which can fairly be chalked up to
perspectivism. On major issues, their rhetoric was extremely similar on issues of crime,
welfare, education, and urban plight. In some ways, their views anticipate what would be
central to Republican rhetoric on matters of poverty, welfare and crime by the 1980s. For
example, Edward Brooke employed language that drew on the view that poverty was an
artifact of a culture, as opposed to economic forces. Brooke spoke at length in his 1966
campaign book The Challenge of Change of the “disadvantaged Negro” and the need to
practice a brand of “bootstrap” philosophical conservatism in government. Brooke can
even be read as perpetuating black stereotypes:
There have always been poor people—but now they seem more listless and
hopeless, and seem to personify the decline of the city itself. There have always
been frustrated minorities—but now, as Newsweek has deftly put “the melting
pot no longer melts, it only boils.’”2 [emphasis added]
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His assessment of government’s ability to address poverty was pessimistic:
No subsidy, service, or study that is not specifically planned to replace
incompetence and fatalism with talents and aspirations can succeed.3 [emphasis
added]

However, Brooke did believe in the importance of subsidy to the poor, and he
acknowledged that sometime provision was inadequate:
Relief payments too must be increased where relief is needed. For in most states
the level of relief is appallingly low…They do not allow the families involved to
make the investment in education and training for themselves and their children
necessary to break free from poverty.4 [emphasis added]
Sargent’s view of welfare is also decidedly negative in tone and indeed implied
that there is significant welfare fraud despite the noble mission of the program:
In Massachusetts, the word ‘welfare’ has come to mean the Public Welfare
system. lt is past due time to tighten, to scrutinize, to ride herd on programs
designed to help the helpless but too often abused by the unscrupulous 5 …[we
should] “support welfare programs aimed at moving people from welfare rolls to
payrolls.”6 [emphasis added]
Once elected to office in his own right in 1970, Sargent even attempted to “wipe
out hunger” through “a proper mixture of the food stamp and commodity distribution
programs, combined with implementation of the newly revised federal school lunch
program to ensure that every child have a healthful lunch at school each day.” (1969) At
the same time, however, he attempted to maintain “fiscal responsibility,” scoring political
points for disparaging those who allegedly abuse the systems of welfare and Medicaid:
Welfare and Medicaid represent almost half of the state’s budget, and their costs
soar not because recipients get more but because the system wastes more. Let’s
get rid of it. Let’s abolish the Department of Public Welfare. Let’s create two
smaller and separate agencies. One to handle payments and eligibility, and the
other to deliver social services. Social workers will serve recipients, financial
experts will protect the taxpayer against fraud and we will have better service for
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less money. …Both savings and service ...that is what I propose.7 [emphasis
added]
These aforementioned policy statements reflect Sargent’s interpretive lens: he
combined a view of a more administratively lean public service provision, which would
be a more generous provision and the view that social policy could improve social
programs. On the matter of support to mothers and families on welfare, Sargent
supported expanding services when necessary:
I will rush the opening of day-care centers so welfare mothers can go back to
work knowing their children are cared for.8 [emphasis added]
Sargent also had what would today be called “liberal” views on crime and crime
prevention:
We will file legislation and take administrative action to deal with the problems of
mental health, drug abuse, and alcoholism, treating the alcoholic as a patient not
a criminal, for the sick are healed by hospitals, not jails.9 [emphasis added]
Governor Sargent also vetoed a renewal of the death penalty in 1974, during his reelection year.
Finally, on the issue of public education, Sargent and Brooke both saw the need
for racial integration in public schools, particularly in Boston, where an extremely highprofile federal case was playing out before the eyes of the nation. Before any of this
occurred, Brooke let his feelings on the subject of integration be known:
The Negro wants to live in an integrated society with all that that implies. He no
longer is willing to live on the outside looking in. He wants his children to attend
good schools. But he also wants them to attend integrated schools. He wants
school busing as necessary but temporary relief in the establishment of integrated
schools. But he also wants the destruction of the Negro ghetto which, among
other benefits, will establish permanent school integration. He wants equal job
opportunities and equal pay for equal skills and equal services.10[emphasis added]
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Sargent did not have the luxury to pontificate on the issue in a hyptothetical sense.
His political future rested largely on his ability to capitalize on the crisis which had
emerged leading to mass demonstrations, protests, and a general uproar in South Boston,
West Roxbury, the North End, and other majority-white working class neighborhoods in
the city. As a member of the party of Nixon, who opposed busing for integration,
Sargent could have opposed the policy as well and challenged it in the courts. He did not.
Instead, he took to the airwaves on May 11, 1974, and painstakingly justified his
position:
You must understand what is at stake in the decision I confront—and what
underlies the highly-charged emotions that have led to so intense an opposition to
this law, that has caused one of the most progressive legislatures in America vote
to repeal one of the nation’s most historic efforts to further social justice . . . In
both Boston and Springfield we have plans that put the total burden for change on
black and white working people in the inner city—and no burden on the richer,
mainly white suburbs . . . My answer to the demand that we turn back the clock
nine years, that we wipe out the commitment we have made is simple, firm and
deeply felt. No . . . Integration is the responsibility of our whole society not one
geographic area, not a handful of neighborhoods, not a tiny segment of the
population of two of our major cities—Boston and Springfield.11
Six months later, Sargent was unable to win election a second term in 1974. He
had taken unpopular positions both on taxes (raising revenue) and school busing.
Similarly, Boston Mayor Kevin White, whom Sargent had defeated in his first bid for
governor in 1970, was a charismatic leader usually thought of as a governor-in-waiting,
but White had acquired the derisive nickname “Mayor Black” as a result of his support
for the federally-mandated public school integration policy.12 He never did win the
governorship, but held on to the mayor’s office until 1979.
Sargent’s plan on school busing was in and of itself an interesting case study: he
had attempted as best he could to both capitalize on and mediate between the divisions
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caused by the federal school busing mandate from federal Judge Arthur Garrity13. Sargent
had taken to the airwaves and announced his own plan for how to implement school
busing and integration in a new way that would both honor the principles of racial
integration and allow school boards to have more control over their policies. This did not
work, and his vote in Boston declined from 96,000 to 60,000 in the intervening four
years.14
Sargent was defeated by a young Michael Dukakis in 1974, who had little to say,
however, about school busing and even won votes in places like South Boston arguably
because voters were dissatisfied with the incumbent Sargent’s handling of the issue.
Two points about Sargent are worth underscoring. One is the margin of support
for the Volpe and Sargent ticket was similar in most suburban counties (in, indeed in
most counties statewide) to the neighborhood margins. The neighborhoods that saw
increased support for Sargent, even in his loss, were Mattapan and Roxbury, and the
South End, as well as the traditional Republican base in the Back Bay/Beacon Hill
neighborhood.
The counties that saw the most similar margin to the Back Bay and Beacon Hill
district, and the Central Boston district (including the Italian-dominated and relatively
ancient North End neighborhood) was Barnstable on the so-called South Shore (and
Dukes County, mostly synonymous with Martha’s Vineyard, a quintessential vacation
island for the wealthy and well-to-do, and Nantucket) . These neighborhoods and the
South Shore represent the base of the Republican party in 1970. The North Shore county
of Essex County is also relatively high in support for Sargent in this period.
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The second point concerns his policy positions. Like Brooke, Sargent believed in
limited government, law enforcement and related policies. However, like Massachusetts
Republicans of that era, Sargent saw a positive role for government. While he certainly
harbored stereotypical views about blacks and the poor, he discussed policies about social
welfare provision and crime in a much more nuanced way than his counterparts in the
1990s would. Moreover, he stood by the enforcement of the most divisive social policy in
post-civil rights Boston city politics.
Republicans failed in consecutive bids for governor after Sargent’s term. Micheal
Dukakis won in 1974 and, again, in 1982, 1984, and 1988. His loss to Edward J. King,
however, might be instructive as evidence of the evolution of racial conservatism as a
campaign ploy. A recession in late 1974 and 1975 had seen an exponential increase in the
demand for social welfare benefits, which in turn squeezed the taxpayer base, and
Dukakis was vulnerable. According to the Globe:
Unemployment rose by more than 50 percent in a single year—1974-75. Welfare,
Medicaid, for the working poor, and unemployment compensation leapt skyward.
By the time Michael S. Dukakis came to his senses in the spring of 1975, he was
forced not only to enact the largest general tax increase in state history, but also to
take an unheard-of step: requesting a separate major tax program to support $450
million of state borrowing to meet current expenses.15
Such policy programs did not prove popular. Dukakis was defeated in the 1978
Democratic gubernatorial primary by the much more conservative Democrat Ed King,
who also won the general election against moderate Republican Frank Hatch. King won,
at least in part, by employing racial conservatism:
Having been caricatured by East Boston neighbors as a human bulldozer when he
was executive director of Massport, King ran a similar campaign against
incumbent Governor Michael Dukakis in 1978. In their TV debate, an instant
classic, King managed to answer, nearly every question, regardless of subject
matter, with some portion of a reminder that he favored capital punishment and
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opposed taxes, welfare, and abortion. To many it seemed a boorish performance,
but it succeeded in distinguishing King with crystal clarity. On primary
day, King took the nomination by a comfortable 75,000 votes.16
King’s crude, racially conservative manner clearly appealed to white South
Boston voters, and not black Roxbury voters in the primary. King found it useful, in light
of an apparent backlash against welfare, to capitalize on the success and even the
program of Ronald Reagan, the losing candidate in the 1976 Republican presidential
nomination campaign and former California governor, a seemingly odd strategy for a
Boston-area Democrat, but one that proved successful. He retained the services of
Robert B. Carleson, Reagan’s former California welfare commissioner who seemingly
popularized the idea of “waste, fraud, and abuse” being the most cost-effective and
policy-neutral way of saving taxpayer money in the welfare system.17 King boasted of
being able to save as much as $300 million annually at the time, while the official plan
from Carleson, who appeared at press conferences with King of roughly $140 million. In
office King emphasized the same issue.18
His opposition to welfare remained central to his re-election strategy in 1982,
which he ultimately lost. His brash manner was clear in the primary’s final televised
debate closing statement: “I ask that you put personalities aside and ask yourself four
simple questions. Who has cut taxes? Who has taken the tough stance against crime?
Who has cut welfare fraud? Who has created new jobs? I have.19
Only in majority-black Roxbury, the gentrifying South End, and the Yankee Back
Bay during the 1978 election did Republicans (who had a liberal standard-bearer in
Francis Hatch) see a margin of victory in any of the neighborhoods in either 1978 or
1982. But after that, Republican candidates for governor in Massachusetts followed a
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simple campaign strategy: they pressed traditional calls for lower taxes and limited
government coupled with an emphasis racial conservatism that played upon anti-black
sentiment among whites in and out of Boston—this translated to a heavy emphasis on
punitive criminal justice approaches, and restricted access to social welfare provisions.
Using this type of campaign rhetoric and advertisement strategy, William Weld won the
governor’s race in 1990 and 1994, defeating Democrats John Silber and Mark Roosevelt,
respectively. Republican Paul Cellucci defeated Democrat Scott Harshbarger in 1998.
After Repblican Jane Swift’s brief tenure, Mitt Romney ran on the Republican ticket and
defeated Democratic nominee Shannon O’Brien in 2002.
As will be discussed further, the string of success of Republican candidates is
noteworthy for at least two reasons. 1) During this time the Democratic Party dominated
at the mayoral, state and Congressional levels; 2) Republican candidates depended upon
white public’s grossly uninformed views of poverty and crime.
Welfare Queens, Underclass Ideology, and the Contract for America
In one sense, Republican success in Massachusetts in the 1990s reflected the
strategy of racial conservatism made popular by Reagan in California as governor, and
subsequently during his races for the White House.
The first exposure Massachusetts voters had to Ronald Reagan was media
coverage of the 1976 New Hampshire Republican primary, which only preceded the Bay
State primary by a few weeks. Reagan was nothing if not consistent: he campaigned on
dismantling the welfare state and any and all programs that advantaged poor, black and
brown people, including at one point a commitment to repealing the Civil Rights Act.
The start of the 1976 presidential campaign offered a chance to Reagan and his
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supporters to dethrone President Ford as head of the Republican party. Partly on a plan to
reduce government, Reagan secured forty-six percent of the primary vote, giving Ford the
closest incumbent margin of victory in the history of the New Hampshire primary. As
reported by 1976 Reagan campaign beat reporter Benjamin Taylor, Reagan’s overall
proposal set the tone for Republican attacks through the twenty-first century:
Under the plan as originally constructed, a Reagan administration would kill
enough federal programs to not only balance the budget, but to also cut personal
Federal income taxes by $25 billion or 23 percent, and even to pay off $5 billion
of the national debt which has swelled to $566 billion...The programs to be cut
would include all Federal aid to education (excluding research); manpower
training; community and regional development, including housing and urban
development programs; many of the government’s transportation programs; and
social welfare programs such as food stamps, unemployment compensation,
public assistance, aid to families with dependent children, and the Medicaid
program.20
These proposals targeted the Great Society and War on Poverty programs of the 1960s,
which were arguably some of the crowning achievements of the Civil Rights Movement,
aimed at improving the lives of millions, disprortionately African-American. Reagan
made his racial conservatism plain during a clandestine meeting with ROAR (Restore
Our Alienated Rights, the main South Boston anti-busing parents and citizens group).
Reagan stood to gain from obliquely leaking the meeting with the small group of
activists. The story, and Reagan’s views on busing, made it to page one of the Boston
Globe:
The meeting was held in Manchester on Jan. 7 and was attended by about 10
opponents of court-ordered busing in Boston. The Boston group had requested
the meeting and asked that it not be publicized….In a New York Times interview
last week, Reagan was asked about court-ordered busing in Boston and said, “I
think the judge’s orders were wrong.” [Reagan spokesman James] Lake said
Reagan told the Boston group that he is opposed to mandatory busing and
bringing it to a halt will be “one of his highest priorities.”21
To be sure, Reagan was not running for mayor of South Boston or senator from New
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Hampshire. It is simply useful to acknowledge that Boston busing was the racialized and
polarizing controversy of the day, and Manchester was part of the Boston media market
and had seen and read all about it, and Manchester voters likely had some personal ties to
the controversy as well.
A few days after this story was leaked, at a candidate Q&A session in Dublin,
New Hampshire,Reagan demonstrated his disregard for the concerns of people served by
programs he was attempting to eliminate:
During the question-and-answer period, John Colony of Harrisvile asked the
former governor how minorities would be able to sustain their gains of the past 20
years without protection of the Federal government . . .Noting that he had lived in
Louisiana while in the Coast Guard, the 30-year-old Colony said: “I’m concerned
about what would happen to minorities as far as education is concerned if you
turn control over to conservative state legislatures…” Reagan’s answer was
twofold. First, he said that even with the transfer of power over social programs
to state and local governments, the Federal government would retain the
responsibility of upholding the Constitution...Secondly, Reagan pointed to the
“great migration of Negroes from the South” in this country and said people have
the right of “voting with their feet” by moving from one state to another.22
This statement couldn’t be more clear, as it signals Reagan’s commitment to policies that
resonated among certain white constituents, not black or other minority voters. People
had every right to leave the state, but not a right to equal treatment while living in it.
When Reagan returned to New England in 1980 for another run at the presidency
during King’s tenure on Beacon Hill, he sat down several times with Boston Globe
reporters to help clarify and amplify his views, improve his accessibility, thus improving
upon his messaging. The political stances he expounds upon are not noticeably different
from his former stances, and his lack of patience for arguments in favor of explicit racial
liberalism could not be clearer, especially with the reporter’s apparent sympathy to
Reagan’s stereotypically driven views of “social breakdown”:
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Q. But, obviously, there is some social breakdown, particularly in poorer
communities. You have kids who have not had parental supervision . . . and if
you're against abortion, it would seem to me you'd be in favor of their being able
to obtain contraceptives.
A. Well, and the government also steps in there. In some of our inner cities, there
are actual cases, many more of them than you would believe, where young girls,
under-age, deliberately go out to have a baby so that they can get what they
call "a pad of their own" because by getting the baby, unmarried, they can
then become put on the Aid to Dependent Children program, and she'll get
on that program, and it's because of the pregnancy - the pregnancy makes
her eligible for the welfare program. Being on the welfare program makes
her eligible for Medicaid. So she then goes and gets rid of the baby, and the
government pays for it with tax dollars, and the government is bound by law
to protect her privacy and not to let her own parents know that they are
okaying her right to go and have this operation. Now there seems to be a
pretty big inconsistency in this….
….Q. In 66, you were quoted as saying you were opposed to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, as an example of federal intrusion.
A. I was opposed at the time - I can't remember the exact details - not for the idea
of doing something against prejudice, certainly. I was opposed to certain
features of that law which went beyond and infringed on the individual
rights of citizens which are supposedly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Q. Which features?
A. Well, they had to do with the, let's say, the person who owns property, his
right to do with his property what he wants to do.
A. You mean discriminate in renting it or discriminate in selling it?
A. At that time, this was what I thought was interfering with the right,
particularly, with the idea of selling. I recognize that that could lend itself to the
same prejudice that we're talking about, and I'm opposed to that prejudice…..I
played on a college football team alongside a black who's today my best
friend, when this was not commonplace. [all emphasis added in these interview
excerpts]
Reagan’s policy positions, once again, are both implicitly racially conservative
(campaigning actively against welfare with familiar anti-poor people tropes) and
explicitly conservative—he rehashes familiar arguments against the Civil Rights Act, the
cornerstone of the Civil Rights movement.
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Another interview is also illuminating in terms of Reagan’s view of “people on
welfare” and Medicaid:
Q. Speaking of federal programs, you criticized Kennedy's proposed health
insurance proposal, calling it "Teddy care,” but what alternative do you offer?
A. Well, I've asked our people to look into the idea of private health insurance
field - 179 million Americans have hospital insurance. Nine out of 10 of those
have surgical insurance along with it. Eight of ten have general medical insurance
along with it. Now, that's a pretty good chunk of our people. Now you have
Medicare for the elderly and you have Medicaid for the medically indigent - the
people on welfare and the people of such low earnings that they can't provide
for themselves. The programs for both of those groups - Medicaid-Medicaid has
been exposed as filled with fraud. It has been exposed as terrifically
extravagant.23 [emphasis added]
President-elect Reagan, after winning New Hampshire in both the primary and the
general election this time, felt it necessary, in late November 1980, to continue his
rhetorical promise from 1976, if not fulfill it. He was always careful to make any
implication of racism explicitly denied, as Rachelle Patterson reported in a Globe story:
“Well now," Reagan said, "let me make this answer very carefully, because I want
everyone to understand that I am heart-and-soul in favor of the things that
have been done under the name of civil rights, desegregation and so forth….I
happen to believe, however, and have felt for a long time and I think a great many
of the black leaders agree also, that busing has been a failure and is not
accomplishing the purpose, a worthwhile purpose that gave it birth. So, therefore,
I think there are better ways to achieve the ends than by continuing this program.”
. . . Reagan said he would sign anti-busing legislation as President. But the issue
may be academic next year since he is expected to choose an Attorney General
and officials of the Justice Department who reflect his views. It is unlikely that
the Justice Department next year will pursue busing as a tool.24 [emphasis added]
Reagan’s political persona as the champion of implicit racial conservatism is thus
intertwined with his early candidacy appearances in the crucial primary state of New
Hampshire.
Back in Massachusetts, Governor Sargent was defeated by a young Michael
Dukakis in 1974. Dukakis had little to say about school busing and even won votes in
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places like South Boston arguably because voters were dissatisfied with the incumbent
Sargent’s handling of the issue. South Boston was also hostile to Senator Brooke, giving
a majority of votes to the opposing Democrat in each of this three elections, in 1966,
1972 and 1978.
However, 1976 saw a Republican primary in Massachusetts for the presidency (a
few weeks after New Hampshire), and former California Governor Ronald Reagan won
the most votes in South Boston among GOP voters.25 The same disparity existed in
reverse when it comes to Roxbury, Brooke as the winner and Reagan the loser. Brooke
seemed to acknowledge openly that he and Reagan appealed to different constituencies,
and that they were not necessarily on the same electoral side.26
Asked whether he would accept a vice presidential nomination if Reagan would
be the eventual Republican nominee, Brooke said: “I doubt it. I don’t think we
could reach an accommodation. We disagree on various issues.”
Brooke doubts that either Reagan or his cause will succeed in 1976, saying: “I
don’t think there are enough conservatives in the primaries to nominate Ronald
Reagan over an incumbent President or incumbent Vice President. He has
emotional appeal, sure, on issues like busing or welfare. But we need a more
centrist candidate. Look what happened to the Democrats with George
McGovern in ’72. The same thing would happen to us.27 [emphasis added]
Just as Republicans Brooke and Reagan were not apparently ideological allies, the
same could be said of Democrats Ed King and Michael Dukakis, who faced each other in
the 1978 Democratic gubernatorial primary. In a very interesting irony, the very insult
Dukakis used to defeat King in a Democratic primary, that King was “Reagan’s favorite
Democratic governor” was first used in a Dukakis television ad. Dukakis’ exaggeration
became accepted truth, as King never held another elective office, and changed his
registration to Republican three years after leaving office. No retrospective article on
King’s life and career would be complete again without that supposed (erroneous) quote

92

from Reagan.28
So it was that in the mid-1970s, the Republican party of Massachusetts began to
suffer a dry spell in gubernatorial elections that lasted throughout the 1980s, even though
Reagan won the state’s electoral votes in both 1980 and 1984. This comes at a time when
there is a large degree of increases in white population in the suburbs and exurbs, and
continued decrease in the white population in most neighborhoods in Boston.
Massachusetts as a whole remained overwhelmingly white, and Boston as a whole did, as
well. However, Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis managed to keep Republicans
out of the corner office for sixteen years in part by remaining popular in the city of
Boston and maintaining an electoral base there.29
John W. Sears, a party functionary, picked up some of the more conservative
voters in the 1982 election. He was also defeated by Dukakis in this contest, however,
and so in 1983 Dukakis began his second gubernatorial administration, after the third
straight Democratic victory and Republican loss. Dukakis became the focus of
conservative Republican antipathy during the 1980s, and most of what occurred in
conservative growth in Massachusetts was indeed over his objection. Massachusetts and
the city of Boston have a history, like many states, of citizen initiatives and referenda.
Several of those referenda are policy-based, conservative-fueled referenda that would
indicate support for the Reagan Republican agenda. While Republicans could not seem
to get elected to statewide elected office in 1980s Massachusetts (including 1986
nominee George Kariotis30), the germ of support for the later Republican base of Weld,
Cellucci and Romney is foreshadowed in the voting percentages seen in the following
neigborhoods that voted in favor of the death penalty, the tax revolt measure, and the
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abortion ban (See Table 4.1). Whether they become law is irrelevant to the their utility in
measuring neighborhood opinion breakdowns, but only Proposition 2 ½ ever saw the
light of day beyond these votes.31

1980s and the Beginnings of a White Republican Resurgence
From 1970 until 2002, a small subset of public policy issues dominated the
majority of the political discourse in Massachusetts: taxes, education, crime, and social
welfare/health care, and perhaps rightly so. School quality, integration, and funding are a
legitimate matter of public concern, as is the strength of the safety net in a capitalistic
economy.
Despite substantial support in many sections of the city in the 1970s and 1980s,
the Republican party was not competitive in gubernatorial campaigns, evidenced by
voting data in Boston neighborhoods during that period. This changed in the 1990s, and,
as noted in previous chapters, Republican appeal was stronger in certain sections of the
city. By the 1990s the nature of the electorate in the city has changed and so had the
campaign strategy.
The germs of support for the later Republican base of Weld, Cellucci, and
Romney are foreshadowed in the voting percentages of the following Boston
neigborhoods that voted for referenda in favor of the death penalty, the tax revolt
measure, and the abortion ban. There is a strong correlation between percentage white
and support for lower taxes, death penalty reinstatement, and an abortion ban.
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Table 4.1
Percentage Support for Referenda in Boston during the 1980s,
by selected neighborhoods

% White
(1980-90)

Anti-Tax
Proposition
2 ½ (1980)
69
69
64

Death Penalty
Reinstatemen
t (1982)
65
63
60

Abortion
Ban
(1986)
52
52
48

East Boston
96-76
West Roxbury
97-95
Hyde Park &
47-38
Mattapan
South Boston
99-96
61
69
64
Central (North
80-74
61
49
32
End)
Charlestown
98-95
60
60
49
South Dorchester 66-50
58
58
55
Back Bay
91-89
53
39
15
North Dorchester 70-59
52
51
46
Allston-Brighton
87-74
51
45
34
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Boston Redevelopment Authority
The data capture the sorts of policies understood to represent the “blend” of ideas about
limited government with ideas about social control and “morality.” Over this same period
of time, the “black wards” in the City of Boston where a majority black population
resided, show a different pattern. The table below shows opposition to the death penalty
and support for Dukakis, and there is a clear association between those two data points
and the percentage of white residents of a particular ward.
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Table 4.2
Percentage Opposed to Death Penalty Referendum in Boston during the
1980s, and support for Dukakis in Same Election (1982), by Ward32
Nonwhite

Oppose
Death
Penalty

Dukakis

Ward 12 (Roxbury)
98
83
93
Ward 14 (Dorchester)
97
83
94
Ward 9 (Roxbury)
90
80
93
Ward 8 (South End,
78
59
86
Roxbury)
Ward 11 (Mission Hill)
59
64
82
Ward 17 (South Dorchester)
58
52
74
Ward 10 (Mission Hill)
57
60
78
Ward 15 (Dorchester)
48
50
76
Ward 13 (Dorchester)
39
48
69
Ward 18 (Hyde Park,
31
40
67
Mattapan)
Ward 21 (Allston-Brighton)
29
60
81
Ward 4 (Back Bay, Fenway)
29
66
74
Ward 3 (Central)
20
51
64
Ward 5 (Back Bay, Fenway)
16
61
69
Ward 19 (Jamaica Plain,
15
52
65
Mission Hill)
Ward 22 (Allston-Brighton)
13
50
74
Ward 6 (South Boston)
8
30
48
Ward 1 (East Boston)
4
35
67
Ward 16 (South Dorchester)
3
36
62
Ward 2 (Charlestown)
2
40
66
Ward 20 (West Roxbury)
1
37
57
Ward 7 (South Boston)
1
32
55
Sources: Annual Report of the Election Commissioners, Boston Redevelopment Authority
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Racial Conservatism in the 1990s
Before returning to the analysis of Massachusetts gubernatorial politics, it is worth
discussing how ubiquitous racial conservatism was in national politics leading up to, and
including, the 1990s:
● Nixon implicitly bemoaned civil rights demonstrations as a disruption of “law and
order” and campaigned against this disruption.33
● Segregationist George Wallace won an overwhelming majority of votes in South
Boston during the 1976 Democratic presidential primary.34
● Ronald Reagan launched his national campaign in Philadelphia, Mississippi, the
location of the 1964 murder of civil rights activists Goodwin, Chaney and
Schwerner. He pledged his allegiance to “states’ rights,” a coded nod and wink to
racial segregationist sentiment among whites in that state. As mentioned before,
he argued for curtailed social welfare provision and coined the term “welfare
queen” in 1976 in a symbolic gesture meant to appeal to racially stereotypical
views of welfare mothers as black and undeserving.35
● Massachusetts inmate Willie Horton, who was furloughed in 1987 during the
administration of Michael Dukakis, and raped and tortured a Maryland couple, a
fact exploited by the 1988 George Bush for President campaign manager Lee
Atwater.36
● Omi and Winant point out that President George H.W. Bush, in 1992, took a
helicopter to a photographic opportunity in Los Angeles during the riots, in which
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he deplored the chaos and violence that erupted as a result of failed social
programs.37
● In 1992, then-Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton flew home to personally witness
the execution of condemned and mentally challenged prisoner, African-American
Ricky Ray Rector. Clinton also condemned rap star Sister Souljah and her violent
lyrics. In 1996, Clinton signed a bill that repealed welfare, flanked by black
women who had formerly been enrolled in welfare.38
● Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) ran a commercial in 1996 implying that his
opponent, Democratic (and African-American) Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt,
was a champion of affirmative action hiring practices, and that he was not “one of
us.”39
This is far from a comprehensive list or discussion of racial conservatism in national
politics. It is meant to provide further emphasis about the salience of racial conservatism
and to underscore the fact that to much of the white public, black dependency and
criminality were the key social problems.
The decade of the 1990s began with a still overwhelmingly white statewide
population, but Suffolk County and its main constituent part, the city of Boston, were
more of an outlier in state population than ever before. With nearly forty percent of the
population not counted as white, there was perhaps never before a starker racial divide
between “the Hub” and its surrounding counties. Barnstable and Plymouth Counties
continued to see an influx of residents, primarily white, and both had over 94% white
populations to start. Boston saw a decline of over 40,000 white residents in the 1990s,
while the suburbs surrounding saw an increase of roughly 100,000.
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It was in this political environment that William Weld, an ambitious prosecutor
with an eye toward making a name for himself, emerged.40 Weld served in the Reagan
Justice Department as Assistant Attorney General before leaving to run for office
statewide in his home of Massachusetts. He was never elected to office before41, but his
media exposure as US Attorney for Eastern Massachusetts seemed to sufficiently prepare
him for a statewide run for governor. During his bid for the Republican nomination,
Weld emphasized his career as a prosecutor in which he actively put criminals behind
bars. Yet he also employed racial conservatism.
Weld’s 1990 opponent, Democratic nominee John Silber, was also not innocent of
employing racial conservatism. In 1990, Silber 1990 ran an anti-welfare, anti-crime
campaign, and in the spring 1989 he said publicly: "The fact is, young girls are having
babies in order to drop out of school and get on welfare.”42 [emphasis added]
What raised Silber to the level of nearly an explicit racism was his behavior over
the course of the primary campaign. For example, responding to a debate question later
printed in the Boston Globe about why he had not addressed the residents of policedesignated “Area B” (including the neighborhoods of Roxbury, and parts of Dorchester
and Mattapan), Silber responded: "I will tell you something about that area. There is no
point in my making a speech on crime control to a group of drug addicts.”43 [emphasis
added] One pundit remarked on what seemed to be the conventional wisdom in the wake
of the controversy, that it ended the Democratic campaign.44
In Weld’s debate with Silber, the racially conservative rhetoric of both campaigns
was on full display. Drawing on assumptions about the alleged underclass, Weld stressed
that welfare recepients should work in order to receive any benefits:
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We need tough work requirements. If you don’t give people on welfare a
deadline to go to work, on the whole, they don’t. I would suggest history has
proven that over time.45 [emphasis added]
Weld is, of course, playing to stereoptypes. He is insinuating to his audience that people on
welfare (black and Latino women) are the problem, and not, say, unemployment, lack-ofchild care and other social services or poverty rates.
By linking the epidemic of violent crime to gangs and drug dealers, Weld also played
the “race card” in the debate. He asserted that there “is almost nowhere that is safe from the
epidemic of violent crime.” And in an allusion to an issue that so damaged Dukakis’s
presidential campaign he theorized “[p]People get mad as hell when they see somebody
released from jail just a couple years after a vicious rape or a violent crime is committed.”
But it was gangs that drew the greatest attention:
“I think we’ve gotta focus on gang violence, on these gang members, dope dealers
who are bringing weapons into Massachusetts. And in order to do that, we need to
increase the sentencing for the career criminals who are threatening us. The average
career criminal commits 244 felonies a year. I say take him off the street for 10
years with a mandatory minimum if he commits a crime with a firearm. I say lets
get a state statute penalizing felons who possess firearms….That would do more to
combat urban violence than any ban on .22 rifles which you yourself possess.”
[emphasis added]
After his election, as an incumbent Republican governor, he began to sound even
more themes of law-and-order, about drugs, about crime, about the death penalty and
about ending parole for violent offenders. This has to be understood from the standpoint
of racial conservatism.
In Boston, Republican support was at its highest for William Weld in 1990 and
especially in his reelection in 1994. Weld ran on themes of corruption on Beacon Hill and
absenteeism by his opponent Mark Roosevelt, a member of a distinguished family. Weld
clearly had an advantage in the 1994 election, riding a wave of Republican discontent
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around the country with the Clintons’ health care plan failure, tax increase (aka economic
stimulus package), and numerous unpopular foreign military interventions (Haiti,
Somalia, and even the failure to intervene in Rwanda). Newt Gingrich and Rush
Limbaugh helped foment voter discontent around the United States in 1994 on the issues
that they classified as “big government” and “welfare” and “crime.” Weld did his best to
highlight his identification with all of those issues, while amassing a campaign war chest
as an incumbent, as well as running early ads demonizing his opponent and associating
him as much as possible with a terrible professional image.
Mark Roosevelt, for his part, seemed on paper to be a strong campaigner.
However, he was hammered over the death penalty despite his campaign theme of
education having been neglected by Governor Weld.46
In an October 1994 rally with Republican Senate nominee Mitt Romney, who
was opposing Edward Kennedy that November, Weld proclaimed his accomplishments
during his first four years:
The people wanted the welfare system reformed. Well, we got in there, we kicked
convicted criminals and drug abusers off the rolls! And we will continue
fighting until every able-bodied person is working for a paycheck, not just
collecting a welfare check. [emphasis added]
The people of this state were fearful of crime. Well, we abolished early release on
parole, we toughened up and we lengthened criminal sentences, and we built more
prison cells so we could lock up the bad guys longer. And we will continue to
fight to bring the death penalty back to Massachusetts. [emphasis added] 47

Here again the themes of racial conservatism are plain. He is appealing to the
fallacious view that 1) welfare is a problem, 2) that it is the source of much fraud and
graft and 3) and that the solution was work requirements, rather than ending poverty for
families and children.
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The results of this election show that the Back Bay once again formed a core of
support along with the Fenway, but a new phenomenon occurred as well: high majority
support in the communities of Roslindale and Hyde Park, as well as South Boston.
In his 1996 State of the State addressed as a Weld returned to the matter of
welfare. 48 He shared the contents of a letter from a young (white) mother, whom he had
invited to his address. In quoting and enthusiastically endorsing he letter, Weld read:
I understand, if I was on welfare, I could go to a training school free. I could get a
daycare voucher. I could get food stamps and a check every two weeks, Mr. Weld.
That sounds to me, Mr. Weld, like luxury! Can you explain to me why I should
not quit my job and go on welfare? [emphasis added]
Governor Weld went on to discuss at length the evils of “illegitimacy” in which his use of
teen pregnancy statistics was dubious in its characterization at best, disingenuous at
worst. He used once again, in the same speech, the rhetorical device of a young girl’s
testimony (though this girl was not present at the address, but had spoken to a reporter):
“A 16 year old recently told the Boston Globe that the main reason some of her teenage
friends were having babies out of wedlock was to get welfare benefits.” It is important
to note that the apparent race-neutral statement is anything but—whites opposed welfare
because black women received benefits.
Weld did read from a section on education policy, which had little to do with
education per se:
This year we are filing a bill to double the mandatory minimum for anyone
who brings an illegal gun on school property, and if a kid brings a gun inside
your child’s classroom, he should not be allowed in that classroom again. We also
want to double the mandatory minimum penalties for anyone who deals drugs to
kids. Along with guns and drugs, gang violence is one of the biggest threats to the
safety of our kids and neighborhoods. Violent gang members belong in prison,
and we’re gonna keep on fighting for tough mandatory minimum penalties to
keep them there. [emphasis added]
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Weld’s insistence on emphasizing the issue of “gang violence” shows again the
use of racial conservatism. He emphasizes “urban” schools and “drugs”—code words that
convey the central point about black and brown deviance and criminality.
On the subject of criminal justice and sentencing reform, Mr. Weld had a
decidedly different view of judicial discretion in sentencing than former Governor Frank
Sargent (who apparently believed in “flexibility” for judges and for a “parole board” that
was “empowered”):
You do hear the argument these days that mandatory minimums interfere with
judge’s discretion. And I say, that’s right, that’s exactly what they’re
supposed to do. When the courts return dangerous criminals to the street
corners as fast as police can haul them in, the public has a right to demand
justice. The public has a right to say that people who prey on our neighborhoods
and our children deserve to be in prison, and it shouldn’t be maybe. It should be
mandatory. [emphasis added]
Finally, Weld made sure his position was clear on restoring the death penalty: “Finally,
for cop-killers, and for other cold-blooded murderers, there is only one penalty, the
maximum penalty, the death penalty.” [emphasis added]
The Senate seat he would vie for was held by the admired but not exceedingly
loved junior Senator from the state, John F. Kerry. The Weld-Kerry contest proved to be
one of the most competitive races in memory, but President Clinton’s popularity in the
state and the reflexive inclination to vote Democratic during national election years
proved to be an insurmountable obstacle for Weld.49
Before considering the career of Paul Cellucci, it is important to underscore a
basic point: racial conservatism is correlated to support among white Bostonians. It
functions more as an ideology than a coherent agenda which changes legitimate “public”
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concerns about poverty, employment, welfare provision, drug use, etc., into ostensibly
“private” concerns about bad behavior, delinquence, and immorality.50
Weld’s successor, Paul Cellucci, had been his lieutenant governor for six years,
and his running mate for a year before that. When assuming the post of “acting governor”
upon the resignation of Weld in 1997, Cellucci soon announced he would be running for
governor in his own right, and proposed several tax cuts that Weld had never enacted.
Cellucci faced opposition to his election from the Attorney General, Scott Harshbarger.
Harshbarger ran on a platform that included expanded and affordable health care, and his
record as a consumer watchdog as Attorney General.51
By contrast, Cellucci mixed traditional conservative positions, particularly
pledges for lower taxes, with racial conservatism. During one debate with Attorney
General Scott Harshbarger in the 1998 campaign for governor, Cellucci gave an extended
answer about his philosophy of criminal justice. The crime that concerned him was street
crime, happening in certain neighborhoods, certainly not suburban ones:
We have very dangerous criminals, we have murderers, we have violent offenders
and they need to be kept in a maximum security prison. There was a headline in
the newspaper not too long ago, it said if crime is down, why are the prisons
overcrowded? Well, because the prisons are overcrowded, crime is down, because
we passed truth in sentencing and mandatory sentencing for drug pushers, we’ve
got these people behind bars, they’re not out in the streets, and they’re not out
in the neighborhoods, committing crime. So my answer to those who say we
should weaken these laws, that we should repeal the minimum mandatory
sentences, that we should weaken the truth in sentencing law, I say no way! If I
get a bill like that to my desk, I’m gonna veto it. I say let’s build more prisons,
let’s put public safety first.52 [emphasis added]

One of the Boston Globe’s writers ridiculed Cellucci’s opponent, Attorney General Scott
Harshbarger (despite the fact that the paper eventually endorsed him) by labeling him a
“preachy activist” a nickname that seemed to stick throughout their coverage.53
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After winning election in his own right, Cellucci focused in his State of the State
addresses almost exclusively on education, in contrast to Weld.54 He promised
maintenance of the Weld-Cellucci policy on welfare reform, but welfare went nearly
unmentioned during his State of the State addresses save for some mentions of “putting
people to work” but without a thorough defense of the program known as “workfare.” He
had also sponsored a health care expansion for the poor using federal funds and funds
from a large tobacco settlement that proved available in 1997 and 1998. During one of his
campaign’s television commercials, a testimonial from a white, working man explained
that he was able to provide health care for his family because of Governor Cellucci. His
signoff line in the ad was, “Hopefully I’ll be off of [Medicaid] soon and I’ll pass it on to
someone who needs it more than I do.”55 [emphasis added] Such a sentiment would
only seem to make sense in a statewide campaign wherein the candidate and his
predecessor had spent a great degree of time vilifying those who accept public assistance.
Cellucci also pledged support for the death penalty, but not frequently and not as
prominently as when he campaigned. Cellucci proved to have an uneventful term save
for the Big Dig. Begun during the Dukakis administration, the Big Dig was the most
expensive road construction project in American history. It involved placing the highrise interstate highway that ran through Boston’s Little Italy, the North End, from which
Cellucci drew majority support during his 1998 election, underground in a new tunnel. It
promised a new revitalization of Boston’s downtown, with hopes that it would lead to a
duplication of New York City’s Central Park. It saw massive cost overruns, false starts,
and, at the tail end, during the Romney administration, the collapse of the newly erected
tunnels on a woman driving through it while her husband sat next to her, helpless.
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Scandal, cost overruns, and even corruption were a large part of this urban redevelopment
story, but Cellucci weathered it well.56 Cellucci stepped down in 2001, leaving the
governor’s chair to his young lieutenant governor, Jane Swift, a former state senator from
the rural Berkshire mountain region, 150 miles from Boston. Swift, 36, was one of the
youngest governors in the state’s history, and was clearly a newcomer to the rough-andtumble of Boston politics.
In her lone State of the State message, Swift devoted the entirety of the speech to
emphasizing new educational standardized testing, charter schools, and English
immersion, all of which are fundamentally conservative Republican initiatives.57
Education is normally the province of Democrats, however, and her emphasis on the
issue (including her invitation to a young black student who had failed her first
standardized test but was now receiving tutoring to re-take it) made her appear liberal. In
actuality, standardized testing is a relatively conservative reform initiative as it involves
little in the way of reallocating key education and financial resources.
Swift had a very rocky tenure as acting governor, and a scandal damaged her
career. Swift at the time had three young children, and lived on their family ranch in the
Berkshires, over 150 miles from Boston. Thus, she received helicopter and limousine
rides from the state capitol back to her home on a regular basis, paid for with
governmental funds. She also gave birth to twins while in office, and conducted cabinet
meetings from her hospital bed soon thereafter, which was controversial, though popular.
Boston was also the embarkation point for nineteen Saudi Arabian members of al-Qaeda
who successfully crashed their plane into the New York World Trade Center. The head
of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, which runs the Boston’s Logan

106

Airport, was forced to resign shortly after September 11, and the head of security at
Logan Airport was under as much pressure as the MBTA chief and Swift herself.58
Acting Governor Swift’s popularity plummeted. When the prospect of Mitt
Romney heading the 2002 Republican gubernatorial ticket emerged as a possibility, he
outpolled her among Republican primary voters by 75-12 in the last poll before she
bowed out of the race. Romney had impressive credentials when he arrived, seemingly
out of nowhere in 2002—a joint law and business degree from Harvard University, a
history as one of the top venture capitalists ever to do business in Boston, and even as a
religious leader to the small Mormon community in the larger Boston region. He also
had just seemingly rescued the Salt Lake City Olympics in 2002 in the face of a scandalplagued and financially insolvent Olympic organization before his entry.
His movie-star good looks and middle age, along with his vast personal fortune
and professional pedigree, made him an ideal candidate. The support for Romney was so
enthusiastic that many began to speak about him as a potential future presidential
candidate, before he had even officially received the Republican nomination for governor
of Massachusetts.
Romney’s strategy was not that different from that which he ran against the iconic
Democratic Senator Edward M. “Ted” Kennedy in 1994. Romney garnered an impressive
45% of the vote in a state where the Kennedy name, reputation, and ideology is often
regarded as synonymous with the political culture of the state.59 Nevertheless, Romney
earned those votes in a year when William Weld, the incumbent Republican governor,
managed to win 70% of the votes statewide, and Republicans nationally captured a net 73
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. So in a Republican watershed year, Romney
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had almost won, but did not win. He lost despite the fact that he was a textbook
Republican candidate, raising money on his own and taking stances (i.e. on abortion) that
allowed him to compete in the state, while emphasizing racial conservatism. Romney’s
chief campaign themes are captured during a 1994 campaign rally with Weld:
Neither the people who are on welfare nor the people who are paying for
welfare think that that’s the answer for getting people back to work. In the real
world, people recognize who are senior citizens that you don’t want to have
recovering drug addicts moving into housing centers that were placed for senior
citizens….being tough on crime, tough on welfare [sic].60 [emphasis added]
In defining “recovering drug addicts” as unworthy of public housing and championing
the victimhood of needy senior citizens, Romney sets himself up as the defender of
middle-class, white Massachusetts voters. What is noteworthy is that, in 1994, these
statements were not credible positions in an era of occupational downsizing and
outsourcing, relatively flat household income, rising consumer credit and trade
agreements that were arguably tied to all those aforementioned trends. Property crime in
Massachusetts was down in 1994, and in 2002, property crime was lower than it had been
since 197861; and welfare never was more than roughly $25 billion per year (in constant
1993 dollars) from its creation in 1970 until its end in 1994, representing only a small
fraction of the overall federal budget. Neveretheless, Romney did better against Ted
Kennedy for that Senate seat than any other Republican ever had (despite ultimately
losing to Kennedy) by stressing these campaign themes first championed by Reagan and
further carried to victory in Massachusetts by Weld.
Eight years later, Romney relied on similar rhetoric. Romney’s campaign rhetoric
largely ignored Swift, and called the Beacon Hill leadership and his opponent, State
Treasurer Shannon O’Brien, the “Gang of Three.” Running against a “Beacon Hill”
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triumvirate that could easily have been replaced with “Capitol Hill” in his rhetoric,
Romney also capitalized on the Republican wave that resulted from the popularity of
President George W. Bush in the wake of 9/11. He emphasized the need for a fresh start
for the state, and characterized Democrats as “bureaucrats” who did too much
“bickering.” Of O’Brien, he told her to her face during a one-on-one debate that her
conduct was “unbecoming” eliciting widespread charges of condescension and sexism
from his critics.
On crime, he was not as silent as Swift had been. In his opening remarks in front
of his posh Belmont estate, he asserted, without elaboration: “Our streets are not as safe
as they should be.”62 [emphasis added] During a response to a reporter’s question in
which the death penalty was now being called into question in many states due to the
widespread use of DNA evidence to clear longtime death row inmates, Romney
responded that he was still an enthusiastic backer of capital punishment:
Science is our friend! We now have the ability through DNA testing. And other
scientific forensic capabilities, to determine whether there is incontrovertible
evidence associated with a particular conviction. And what I would like to do is in
the case of certain heinous crimes: terrorism, murder of witnesses to trials, crimes
of terrible abuse towards children, the likes of which we’re reading about in our
papers, I’d like to make sure that in those cases, the death penalty is an option. I’d
have a trial where there is a conviction based on surpassing the standard of
without a reasonable doubt. But then I’d also have a separate procedure, which
would be based upon assuring there is incontrovertible evidence that the person is
guilty. And in that circumstance, where there’s a heinous crime, and such clear
evidence, I believe the death penalty is necessary. It deters such crimes. It is the
right thing to do. And I’m convinced it will make a difference for the safety of the
people of Massachusetts, and that’s why I support it.63 [emphasis added]

So again in an era when the rates of violent crime were down, Romney continued to
make political use of concerns about “street crime,” and ostensibly weak sentencing for
defendants sentenced for murder.
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Needless to say, none of those suggestions were ever implemented, though the
condescension in the room was palpable, even on videotape. In fact, the death penalty as
an issue was never formally addressed again during Romney’s term of office. The verbal
and rhetorical gymnastics he did in that moment did speak to a cornerstone of the WeldRomney strategy that Romney would ditch: harsh punishments for criminal offenders, a
stance that was not neutral, but pregnant with racial connotations. He had done what was
necessary to achieve his goals: he made substantive policy suggestions in the
conservative direction of both crime and welfare, as well as education. He had also run
commercials substantively mimicking Swift’s idea on English immersion in schools for
non-native English speakers. In large letters, next to his smiling face, one commercial
showed : “End Bilingual Education” which has much more of a harsh tinge than a slogan
that might have read instead “Promote English Immersion.” Still, Romney won the
election with a decisive, if not comfortable margin. Romney became the third consecutive
Republican to win the governor’s race. This owed itself, partly, to demographic trends
among relevant constituencies, and the ongoing appeal of racial conservatism in
gubernatorial elections.
In these elections, which truly represent the zenith of Republican strength with
Paul Cellucci and Mitt Romney guiding the way respectively in 1998 and 2002, the south
counties of Barnstable and Plymouth continue to provide the base of support they always
did, along with the North Shore county of Essex, and the exurb county of Worcester. The
coalition of this era is unlike the Republican coalition of the Sargent-Brooke era, having
achieved margins of victory statewide without even approaching a majority in the capital
of Boston. Map 1 and Map 2, found in the Appendix, illustrate the average Republican
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coalition in the Sargent-Brooke 1970s (the 1974 election being the most representative)
and the Republican coalition in the 1990s (the 1998 election being the most
representative).64
The ward-based returns already show that Romney allowed support to decline
even in white-majority districts, but South Boston and Charlestown voted as they did for
Cellucci. Precinct-based returns show that Romney won several precincts in Irish South
Boston and the Italian North End. He won a majority in none of the neighborhoods in the
City of Boston, marking a decidedly grand shift from the Weld-Cellucci coalition, which
relied on Italian and Irish neighborhoods in the Hub to provide their margins of victory
statewide. Romney was unconcerned, and spent the next four years acting as a fairly
conservative governor on economic and social issues. He even underwent a conversion
for which he would later be criticized, that of “pro-choice” on abortion during the 2002
campaign to “pro-life” before the end of his term as governor in 2007.65
Even then his strategy seemed to be aimed at the White House, and his decisions
and his rhetoric reflected national, rather than Massachusetts-specific, concerns. He
spoke of lower taxes and regulations, and told union members he disagreed with back pay
for union negotiated collective bargaining agreements, saying it was against his
“philosophy” (attempting to essentially take away any bargaining power from public
sector unions at all). He continued the Weld assault on “illegitimacy” when discussing
welfare: “I will propose that we put meaningful work requirements in welfare and that we
insist that absentee fathers—not taxpayers—are held financially responsible for their
own children.”66 He even stressed an anti-welfare policy position that was fundamentally
out of date, a vestigial relic of the Reagan-Weld rhetoric, and now with the enxistence of
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a new social welfare program, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), was a
fait accompli: “I'm putting money into childcare programs so that every able-bodied
person can have the dignity of working for their benefits.”67
He went on:
While the rest of the country fully implemented workfare, Massachusetts did
not…It's past time to bring real welfare reform to Massachusetts. People from
both political parties have long recognized that welfare without work creates
negative incentives that lead to permanent poverty. It robs people of self-esteem.
But today, only 20 percent of welfare recipients in Massachusetts are
working. [emphasis added]
This year, we will take a close look at all our welfare programs to make sure they
are serving as a safety net and not a poverty trap. And work requirements must
be provided wherever possible. Let's make sure we are giving people the
opportunity to achieve independent and fulfilling lives. [emphasis added]

His signature achievement, of course, was RomneyCare, and this was his justification of
it during his State of the State message in 2006:
First, the stage is set for something truly historic. We are poised to provide
private, market-based health insurance to all our uninsured citizens. This isn’t
government taking over healthcare and dictating who gets treated for what
and by whom. No, it’s government helping people take over healthcare, to get
healthcare working for them. Think about it: 500,000 people, all without health
insurance today, will have quality preventative care, prescription benefits, and
hospitalization coverage. [emphasis added]
Romney’s health program was much friendlier to insurance interests in the state
than “government taking over health care and dictating who gets treated for what and by
whom,” and was created by the same consultants that later developed the federal
“ObamaCare” plan in 2010, and was largely similar—a health care exchange that
subsidized some low-income buyers, and mandated that everyone in the state purchase
some kind of insurance if they did not already have it.68
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Romney’s calculus did not take into consideration the health of the Massachusetts
Republican party whatsoever, though. He did not direct resources toward Republican
legislative candidates during the state “midterms” of 2004 (a presidential election year),
nor did he signal until late 2005 that he would not be a candidate for re-election in 2006.
He immediately began fundraising and campaigning for the 2008 Republican presidential
nomination, for which he fell short, losing to John McCain.69
Perhaps what is most noteworthy, however, is not Romney’s implicit racialized
language in the form of crime, welfare, and health care policy, but his explicit language
in regards to education policy. Knowing that racialized, segregated education has been an
issue in Massachusetts since the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s and well into the
modern era, Romney did not hesitate to discuss and perpetuate the racial stereotypes that
already exist in the mind of white voters when he gave his State of the State message in
2005:
But there are troubling gaps. There is still much to do. Kids in our urban schools,
most of them minorities, are not succeeding at anywhere near the rate of their
counterparts in the suburbs. And let me be clear: the failure of our urban schools
to prepare our children today for the challenges of tomorrow is the civil rights
issue of our generation. ….Ten years ago, it was felt that if we provided equal
funding for urban schools, the disparity would just disappear. It has not. Yet there
will be some who will simply cry for even more money. But we know money
alone is not the answer . . . . Many of the features I will offer will apply only to
failing districts. Here are a few: 1) A longer school day, with provision for special
help, study hall and sports. Learning should last well into the afternoon, not end at
2 o'clock. 2) Our best teachers are underpaid. They deserve more and I want to
pay them more. Finally, I will propose, again, mandatory parental preparation
courses in failing school districts. Parental involvement in a child's education is
more important than any step we can take. Not all teachers can be parents, but all
parents must be teachers.”70 [emphasis added]
Romney is capitalizing on the traditional white racial stereotype of black culture
that absentee fathers (a term, incidentally, he regularly also used in State of the State
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addresses) are the root cause of the lower socioeconomic status endured by AfricanAmericans. Parental involvement was thought to be the answer. By drawing on racial
stereotype, policy prescriptions flatten and simplify a very complicated problem, that
starts with high rates of child poverty. It is difficult to imagine a more explicit and
official governmental proclamation that faults racial minority populations for for their
own disadvantage.
Conclusion
Racial conservatism, thus, is an apt frame of analysis for Massachusetts elections.
Whether or not it is determinative or not of electoral outcomes, it is clearly present in
Massachusetts’ (and national) politics in the post-Civil Rights era. Whether the themes of
racial conservatism are emphasized are no longer in dispute. Whether those racial
conservatism themes make an electoral impact on neighborhoods that are particularly
focused on racial politics such as Southie and Roxbury may still be argued, but a
preponderance of evidence of its use and its impact certainly exists, as is seen in both
Chapters 3 and 4. Racial alliances that incorporate political networks and institutions
within them are clearly working when racial conservatism is invoked. Racial
conservatism is a clear manifestation of racial orders perpetuating themselves. Thus, the
presence of racial conservatism in Boston elections demonstrates that American racial
alliances are as present in Massachusetts as they are in any American state, and as present
in Boston as in any American city. The next question actually becomes not whether racial
conservatism and racial alliances exist, but whether both will operate in the same way by
political actors in the succeeding eras.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
It is clear in this analysis that, in the era since the end of the Civil Rights
movement, Massachusetts Republicans have responded to increasing white flight from
urban centers and the suburbanization of Massachusetts by adopting a strategy of
promoting the most racialized form of conservatism, which involves heavily invoking
white fears of black crime and white stereotypes of black laziness in partisan
mobilization. The effects of this strategy are in evidence by analyzing electoral maps of
the city of Boston, which reveal that the only competitive areas for Republicans in the
city are those with overwhelming white majorities and that areas are those which have
particular histories around civil rights issues like busing.
By eliminating the rural or suburban variable, one sees a clearer picture of which
voters make up the Republican party in Boston, one of the chief bastions of liberalism in
America. What emerges in those elections in which Republicans were successful is an
emphasis on the aspects of urban life such as street crime and government anti-poverty
programs, that play upon stereotypical views about poor blacks and Latinos. This
dissertation follows the changing demographics of neighborhoods with close attention to
racial conservatism with respect to candidates for state office (especially governor).
A brief review of the findings shows the evolution of racial conservatism.
Governor Sargent proposed that the state eliminate the department of Public Welfare, but
also promised to integrate the schools. Senator Brooke told welfare mothers and undereducated black residents that they should want to work. Ed King proposed saving money
for the people of the state by depriving some people of benefits, in other words, by
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“tightening restrictions” on welfare in a similar way that Reagan did, even bringing in
Reagan’s old welfare commissioner for advice. Reagan’s political operatives helped craft
the Willie Horton message for the 1988 Bush campaign, and then proceeded to take over
the Massachusetts Republican party and elect one of their own, William Weld, to the
Beacon Hill corner office with a message of ending welfare and bringing back the death
penalty. Weld won despite the fact that the Democratic candidate, John Silber, used the
same racial tropes to win the Democratic nomination in 1990. Indeed, in the 1990s and
early 2000s the Republicans won four straight elections with this strategy.
Why? From what can be observed about white response to racial messaging,
implicit appeals work better than explicit ones. Voters accepted the messages about
criminality, dependency and so forth, and endorsed it, because the appeals drew on more
latent racial and ethnic stereotypes. Terms like “people on welfare” or “welfare mothers”
conjured the image of the stereotypical poor black woman. The trope of the “criminal” is
imagined to black man. Willie Horton was an exemplar of this trope because he was also
a rapist of a woman who was white. So it is thus that the invocations of “crime” and
“welfare” were classic redressing of the old racial tropes of criminal black men and poor
black women.
On one hand, candidates almost cannot be blamed for adopting such a strategy,
because it won votes. However, such an analytical absolution excuses all manner of
ruthless electioneering, and discounts the damage racial conservatism does to authentic
and credible policy debate on a range of public policy issues that have little to do with
law enforcement or cash assistance to the poor.
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A second major point concerns the city of Boston as the case that carries
implications for the study of American politics more broadly. The neighborhoods of
Boston are fundamentally meant as a surrogate for the neighborhoods of the American
city, and indeed, as a surrogate for America as a whole, and should not be viewed as a
highly particular, racially conservative outlier in American cities. In fact, Boston,
according to a recent paper published in the American Political Science Review, is one of
the six most politically liberal cities in the United States.1 There is everywhere in
America a Little Italy, a Chinatown, a black neighborhood, a new Latino neighborhood, a
wealthy neighborhood, and a working-class white neighborhood. Before the Civil Rights
era, there were no doubt elections won and lost in the city of Boston and the state of
Massachusetts by pitting ethnic groups against one another. There is also no doubt that
Boston is not alone among major cities in such a distinction. What is striking is how
penetrative the language has been in the post-Civil Rights era, and the extent to which the
majority backlash against has been making and breaking gubernatorial elections in
Massachusetts for over four decades.
As discussed in chapter 4, and as detailed by Tali Mendelberg in her analysis
1994, the “race card” was ubiquitous in gubernatorial politics in Massachusetts and
elsewhere. She cites the gubernatorial elections, primarily, as fertile ground for racial
priming:
Republican governors who have risen to prominence in recent years, such as
[Ridge, Jeb Bush, Pataki] all ran election campaigns that featured ads attacking
their opponents for being lax on violent crime. These messages, by design or by
circumstances, whether on their own or as conveyed by the news media, tended
implicitly to refer to violent black criminals. Other prominent Republican
governors were elected in part by highlighting their tough anti-welfare stance, a
message that the media often conveys with visual references to African
Americans.2
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While perhaps playing the race card has not been as successful a strategy since the
mid-1990s, it is a strategy which Massachusetts Republicans stuck to for a long time.
Indeed racial conservatism is a recognizable factor in each of the major Republican
statewide runs after 2002.
Post-Racial Conservatism?
Another point is more speculative, but it may be that racial conservatism has
outlived its utility. After four straight Republican victories, the 2006 race for governor
seemed primed for a Democratic win. Deval Patrick, a former assistant U.S. attorney for
Civil Rights in the Clinton administration, had practiced law in the private sector since
2001. A native of Chicago, Patrick entered the elite secondary boarding school Milton
Academy in Milton, Massachusetts on a scholarship, and went on to earn a law degree
from Harvard University. Patrick mounted an insurgent campaign that was garnering
significant support.
Racial conservatism did not work in 2006. Running against the Republican
nominee and incumbent Lieutenant Governor Kerry Healey, Deval Patrick was able to
successfully name and accuse the Healey campaign of race-baiting. It would have been a
difficult case to make against Healey, the Ph.D. in Criminology, except that Healey had
made a reference to Patrick’s sister being a victim of marital rape in 1993, more than a
decade in the past.3 A television ad also made reference to Patrick’s history as a defense
attorney who represented other alleged rapists.4 This was merely the last desperate tactic
of her campaign, and it backfired. Patrick won every neighborhood in Boston and every
county in Massachusetts. His support was strongest, however, in Dorchester and
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Roxbury, where he received more than 90% of the vote, in much the same style as former
Democratic Governor Michael Dukakis and former Republican Senator Edward Brooke.5
As governor, Patrick continued to slash budgets, even more so than Romney had
done. Romney had not raised taxes, and Patrick, seeking to assuage moderates, pledged
not to raise taxes, either. Despite his progressive campaign themes, Patrick aggressively
asked his new department heads to submit budget requests with a five to ten percent
expenditure reduction in order to compensate for the state’s rising Medicaid
contribution.6 He proved a popular governor, however, and saw the implementation of
the new health care exchanges under his administration. When the major insurance
carriers sought to raise the rates significantly after the first year of the new program,
Patrick attempted to negotiate with them to lower the cost of their premiums.7
One of those executives, Charlie Baker, formerly policy architect of Weld’s
welfare reform law CEO of Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, a large insurance carrier based
only in Massachusetts, successfully sought the Republican nomination to run for
governor against Patrick in 2010.8 Patrick won re-election handily, again winning every
ward in the city of Boston.9 He largely saw similar margins in each neighborhood to his
old classmate Barack Obama, who had won the 2008 presidential election with help from
his victorious Boston and Massachusetts showing, despite running against a former
Massachusetts governor, Romney.
If racial conservatism does not work, even against an African American
candidate, why would that be? Perhaps racial conservatism is historically bounded—that
it would be effective while the policy legacies of the 1960s were still resonant in city,
state and national politics. But by the beginning of the 21st century that cannot be said.
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Racial conservatism as policy has replaced racial liberalism: welfare was “reformed,” the
prison population expanded, affirmative action policies were scaled back if not
eliminated, and busing has disappeared as a remedy to racial segregation in schools.
Or perhaps racial resentment becomes manifest in a different way. In 2009, soon
after assuming office, President Obama began negotiating to draft and pass new
legislation that would overhaul the nation’s health care system. There were several
options to choose from, but those experts tasked with designing the plan were the same
experts who had designed the Massachusetts legislation that Mitt Romney had signed and
Governor Deval Patrick had overseen. So, it was perhaps a foregone conclusion that the
bill would look similar in character. However, President Obama failed to recognize how
unpopular this bill might be to those who already have insurance, and that included
residents of the Bay State who now had a nation-leading 97% of residents covered under
some type of health care plan since RomneyCare was implemented by Governor Patrick.
In a sad twist of irony, the leading advocate for a system of nationally-run and subsidized
health care, Senator Ted Kennedy, died soon after the inauguration of President Obama,
who was intent on passing the bill Kennedy was sponsoring. The “Kennedy Seat” would
now be up for election.10
Capitalizing on voter confusion and racial resentment that Tesler has documented,
Scott Brown, a plainspoken Republican state senator with a thick Boston accent and a
signature pickup truck he drove while campaigning (to symbolize is working class
sympathies), defeated Democratic Attorney General Martha Coakley on January 19,
2010. This marked the fourth time in twelve years that a state constitutional officer lost
an election for governor or senator (after Harshbarger, O’Brien, and Reilly all went down

123

to defeat in primaries or general elections), so it is not surprising in hindsight. At the
time, however, the shock was felt due to the exponential rise in the polls of the previously
unknown Brown. Coakley was castigated by the press (and the Obama administration
press office) for her comment that Brown was seemingly campaigning too vigorously.11
Despite a personal visit from President Obama, the special election was lost to Brown,
who, for the first time since 1998, cracked the Democratic stronghold in the city of
Boston by winning a majority of votes in both of the two South Boston wards.

2010 and Beyond
In several neighborhoods within Suffolk County, there is barely a white
population, such as in the planning districts of Roxbury and Mattapan. Barnstable still
has the highest percentage of whites in their population, and that proportion is the only
one above 90% in metropolitan Boston. The neighborhoods with the highest proportion
of white residents in Boston are the Back Bay (81%) South Boston (79%) and
Charlestown (76%). These majorities can thus no longer guarantee support for
conservative candidates. South Boston was where Republicans once garnered some
support, but even the Back Bay is no longer a bastion for the party. Republicans are
winning, it is the contention of this thesis, similar levels of support among whites in these
neighborhoods as they are achieving outside of these communities, but their support does
not register because it is of course more than simply whites who vote in elections. In
2006 and 2010 the Republicans performed well in their bases—90% white South Shore
Barnstable and Plymouth counties—but did not come close to cracking the 30% margin
in Boston in either election.
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As a result of the massive demographic change in Boston, it is safe to say that
Republicans have largely abandoned the city to compete almost exclusively in the
suburbs. Republicans are not reaching out to minorities in these communities and indeed,
in some cases, are achieving higher margins among whites in these communities which
will not help them in the long run. What is abundantly clear is that even if the
Republicans are doing well in their traditional bases, they are losing elections partially
because they have not done enough minority outreach, and there must be an underlying
reason for this. Either the Massachusetts Republican Party is ignorant about how to
achieve such outreach, or their program is inherently hostile to most minority residents of
Boston. It is worth discussion.
Boston as a whole is representative of the party identification change taking place
in Massachusetts in terms of the decrease in voters registered as Democratic and the
increase in un-enrolled voters. The Republican percentage in Massachusetts has
decreased by roughly half overall, but stays relatively constant in Boston. A possible
conclusion from this analysis is that the same demographic trend is occurring in both the
city and the state, but that it’s simply more pronounced in Boston. These trends partly
reflect changes in racial and ethnic demographics.
While Democrats have accepted the black majorities of Roxbury and now
Mattapan and Dorchester into their coalition, it is not until recently that African
Americans represent the cornerstone of the Democratic electoral coalition in the city.
They certainly are still not that cornerstone in the state. Despite the election of the first
black governor in the state’s history, racial disparities continue to shape Massachusetts
politics and public policy. Welfare has been reformed, “crime” of certain types is down
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across many measures, but health care for the poor has never been popular in
Massachusetts overall. Scott Brown proved that while campaigning against the health
care law in his special election in 2010. It is perhaps on new fronts—e.g. funding for
Medicaid or immigration—where implicit appeals to race might matter in coming years.
On the other hand, it is entirely possible that racial conservatism is past its heyday.
Whatever the future of Massachusetts politics, racial conservatism was clearly the
dominant electoral strategy and ideology of candidates for governor of the Republican
and sometimes Democratic party in the post-Civil Rights era.
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